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Abstract 
Resisting Everything Except Temptation:  
Evidence and an Explanation for Domain-Specific Impulsivity 
Eli Tsukayama 
Advisor: Angela Lee Duckworth  
 
Why do people act self-controlled in some situations but not others? More specifically, 
why does it appear that an individual can be self-controlled in one domain (e.g., work) 
but impulsive in another (e.g., food)? This investigation tests a model that incorporates 
and explains both domain-specific and domain-general differences in impulsive behavior. 
Specifically, the model predicts that within-individual variation across domains is 
explained by subjective domain-specific appraisals of temptation and perceived harm, 
whereas domain-general impulsivity is explained by domain-general self-control 
strategies (e.g., pre-commitment) and resources (e.g., working memory). In Chapter 1, 
four studies test this model in adults. Studies 1 and 2 present the development and 
validation of a self-report questionnaire assessing impulsive behavior in six domains: 
work, interpersonal relationships, drugs, food, exercise, and finances. In Study 3, domain-
specific appraisals of temptation and perceived harm are shown to explain within-
individual variance in impulsive behavior, whereas domain-general self-control explains 
variance in domain-general impulsive behavior between individuals. Study 4 confirms 
that individuals in special interest groups (e.g., procrastinators) who are especially 
tempted in the target domain (e.g., work) are not likely to be more tempted in unrelated 
domains (e.g., food). Chapter 2 explores domain-specificity through the temporal 
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discounting paradigm. Whereas self-report measures of impulsivity are sensitive to social 
desirability biases, choices in temporal discounting (sooner-smaller vs. later-larger 
rewards) are not as transparent. As predicted, temporal discounting is domain-specific, 
and domain-specificity in temptation partially explains domain-specificity in temporal 
discounting. Chapter 3 presents the development and validation of a domain-specific 
measure for children, motivated by the idea that some of the domains relevant for adults 
may not be relevant for children given that the average child presumably is either not 
attracted to certain temptations, does not perceive them as harmful, or does not frequently 
encounter them. For children, interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity are shown to be 
correlated but distinct behavioral tendencies, demonstrating differentiated relationships 
with dimensions of childhood temperament, Big Five personality factors, and school 
outcomes. Collectively, these findings highlight the utility of a domain-specific approach, 
namely in terms of understanding psychological processes, improved prediction, and 
targeted interventions. 
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Abstract 
We propose a model of impulsivity that predicts both domain-general and domain-
specific variance in behaviors that produce short-term gratification at the expense of 
long-term goals and standards. Specifically, we posit that domain-general impulsivity is 
explained by domain-general self-control strategies and resources, whereas domain-
specific impulsivity is explained by how tempting individuals find various impulsive 
behaviors, and to a lesser extent, in perceptions of their long-term harm. Using a novel 
self-report measure, factor analyses produced six (non-exhaustive) domains of impulsive 
behavior (Studies 1-2): work, interpersonal relationships, drugs, food, exercise, and 
finances. Domain-general self-control explained 40% of the variance in domain-general 
impulsive behavior between individuals, reffect = .71. Domain-specific temptation (reffect = 
.83) and perceived harm (reffect = -.26) explained 40% and 2% of the unique within-
individual variance in impulsive behavior, respectively (59% together). In a third study, 
we recruited individuals in special interest groups (e.g., procrastinators) to confirm that 
individuals who are especially tempted by behaviors in their target domain are not likely 
to be more tempted in non-target domains. 
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Resisting Everything Except Temptation:  
Evidence and An Explanation for Domain-Specific Impulsivity 
 
“I can resist everything except temptation.” 
–Oscar Wilde (1893) 
 
“All men are tempted. There is no man that lives that can’t be broken down, provided it 
is the right temptation, put in the right spot.” 
–Henry Ward Beecher (1887) 
 
On December 11, 2009, Tiger Woods (2009) confessed publicly that he had been 
unfaithful to his wife and announced “an indefinite break from professional golf” (¶ 3). 
Just over two months later, after 15 different women alleged having had an affair with 
him (Mueller, 2009), Woods (2010) made a second public statement, in which he 
acknowledged that infidelity went against his “core values” and that he had known at the 
time his actions were wrong (¶ 11). Still, he could not resist “all the temptations” around 
him (¶ 11). The news was particularly sensational given Wood’s “squeaky clean image” 
(Araton, 2010, ¶ 1), which personified “almost fanatical self-control” (Tanenhaus, 2009, 
¶ 11). As Surowiecki (2009) notes, “Woods’s appeal was based, ultimately, not on his 
physical abilities but on his mental toughness, his extraordinary capacity for focus and 
discipline” (¶ 3). Known as “the exemplar of mental discipline” (Brooks, 2008, ¶ 3), 
Woods demonstrated remarkable self-control in many domains of life. By all accounts, 
Woods had an incredible work ethic that enabled him to maintain a grueling physical 
training regimen. In public, he was always poised and in control of his emotions. He did 
not smoke, do drugs, or drink heavily. Thus, it seems that Tiger Woods epitomized self-
control in many arenas. Yet, he was impulsive when it came to extramarital sex. 
How do we explain Tiger Woods? Is he a paragon of self-control—“the capacity 
for altering one’s own responses, especially to bring them into line with standards such as 
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ideals, values, morals, and social expectations” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007, p. 
351)—or the epitome of impulsivity?1 Or, is this the wrong question to ask—is impulsive 
behavior so dependent upon situational factors that it makes no sense to think about 
impulsivity in domain-general terms? The current investigation addresses these questions. 
We propose and test a model that explains both domain-general and domain-specific 
variance in impulsive behavior. Our approach was as follows: First, we used factor 
analyses to identify (Study 1a) and confirm (Study 1b) distinct domains of impulsive 
behavior. Then, we tested whether between-individual domain-general impulsivity could 
be explained by domain-general self-control, and whether within-individual variation in 
impulsivity across domains could be explained by corresponding differences in the 
subjective temptation and perceived harm of these behaviors (Study 2). Finally, we 
recruited individuals in special interest groups (e.g., procrastinators, impulse shoppers) 
from a social networking website to confirm that temptation is domain-specific (Study 3). 
Domain-General and Domain-Specific Aspects of Personality 
It is now generally recognized that behavior is both domain-general and domain-
specific (Epstein & O'Brien, 1985),
2
 and we do not claim that either domain-general or 
domain-specific processes are “stronger” than the other in this paper. Nonetheless, some 
historical context on the general versus specific debate would frame our investigation. 
Whether situational factors or domain-general personality traits hold the upper 
hand in determining behavior has been fiercely debated since Walter Mischel’s (1968) 
                                                            
1 The terms impulsivity and self-control are used differently by different authors (Duckworth & Kern, 
2011). Our definition of impulsivity emphasizes the failure to bring one’s behavior in line with ideals, 
values, morals, and social expectations. 
2 By domain general, we mean that behavior (that reflects a trait) in one situation tends to be correlated with 
similar behavior across different situations. For instance, impulsive behavior in one domain is predicted to 
correlate with impulsive behavior in other domains. 
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controversial monograph, Personality and Assessment. Reviewing the extant literature on 
domain-generality in personality, Mischel (1968) concluded, “Although behavior patterns 
often may be stable, they usually are not highly generalized across situations” (p. 282). 
Some psychologists, notably those in the social psychology tradition, have since 
questioned the utility of domain-general personality traits. Ross and Nisbett (1991), for 
instance, suggested, “Manipulations of the social situation can overwhelm in importance 
the type of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally 
think of as being determinative of social behavior” (p. xiv).  
Three sources of empirical evidence argue convincingly against an extreme 
situationist explanation for impulsive behavior. First, Baumeister and colleagues have 
shown in laboratory studies that factors determining self-controlled behavior are, at least 
to some extent, domain-general (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; 
Baumeister, et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In a typical experiment, exerting 
self-control in one domain is shown to impair subsequent attempts to exercise self-control 
in other domains. For instance, suppressing emotions diminishes physical stamina, 
suppressing an unwanted thought decreases the ability to suppress emotions, and 
refraining from eating warm chocolate chip cookies reduces persistence in working on 
problem-solving tasks (Baumeister, et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). 
Second, personality psychologists who study impulsivity have succeeded in 
predicting theoretically relevant and objectively measured life outcomes using domain-
general personality questionnaire items such as “I am self-disciplined.” For example, in 
prospective, longitudinal studies in which socioeconomic background and general 
intelligence were controlled, domain-general questionnaire measures of impulsivity in 
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childhood have been shown to predict decreases in report card grades (Duckworth, 
Tsukayama, & May, 2010), unhealthy weight gain (Duckworth, Tsukayama, & Geier, 
2010; Tsukayama, Toomey, Faith, & Duckworth, 2010), and informant ratings of 
substance abuse and government records of criminal convictions (Moffitt et al., 2011). 
Finally, Mischel himself has shown in a series of experiments that self-control in 
young children is facilitated by domain-general metacognitive strategies (Mischel & 
Mendoza-Denton, 2003). For example, in the preschool delay of gratification task, 
children cued to dwell on the “cool” features of rewards (e.g., “If you want to, when you 
want to, you can think about how the marshmallows look like white puffy clouds”) were 
able to wait twice as long as children cued to dwell on their consummatory, “hot” 
features (e.g., “If you want to, when you want to, you can think about how sweet and 
chewy the marshmallows taste”) (Mischel & Baker, 1975). The same psychological 
distancing strategy has been shown to facilitate self-control in other domains, including 
emotion regulation (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross, 
Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, in press; Ochsner & Gross, 2004). Strategies 
that reduce the hedonic pull of temptations—for example by manipulating their salience 
or representation—should in theory be deployable in any domain (see Carlson & Beck, in 
press; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Fujita, 
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003). Indeed, children who 
can wait longer in the preschool delay of gratification task grow up to be more competent 
across health, interpersonal, academic, and work domains (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; 
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Hence, ceteris paribus, individuals equipped with 
these strategies should be more self-controlled across all domains. 
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And, yet, Tiger Woods and many less famous individuals defy easy categorization 
as either impulsive or self-controlled. In practice, most personality questionnaire items 
(e.g., “I am self-disciplined”) are domain-general in the sense that they do not explicitly 
specify context. The omission of explicit target situations requires the respondent to 
consider his overall level of behavior. One can imagine a respondent whose self-control 
is extraordinary when it comes to finishing work assignments on time but minimal when 
it comes to kicking a smoking habit; faced with a question on his overall level of self-
control, this individual might say “moderate.” Mischel and Shoda (1995) have pointed 
out that such practices implicitly treat domain-specific deviations from mean levels of 
behavior as error or noise. 
As Mischel himself advocated, both in his 1968 monograph and in more recent 
writings (e.g., Mischel, 2004), the search for coherence in personality lies not in the 
negation of the situation but in its active study. In doing so—and specifically in 
examining patterns of behavior that are consistent across certain types of situations—we 
might “reconcile the variability of the individual’s behavior across situations with our 
intuitive conviction that each individual is characterized by stable and distinctive 
qualities” (Mischel, 2009, p. 284). This nuanced, moderate position—and the need to 
examine within-individual differences in behavior—has also been advocated by other 
leaders in personality psychology (Fleeson, 2001, 2007; Funder, 2009; Lucas & 
Donnellan, 2009; Roberts, 2007). Still, empirical efforts that focus on domain-specificity 
in personality remain rare: “Despite the intrinsic contextualized nature of personality 
traits, the measurement of situations is typically tossed unceremoniously into the black 
box of the personality trait inventory” (Roberts, 2007, p. 1077). Domain-specific “if-
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then” profiles of behavior patterns (e.g., if Woods is in the sex domain, then he is likely 
to give into temptation, but if he is in the work domain, then he is likely to act self-
controlled) should improve predictive validity and, more importantly, provide a deeper 
understanding of individual differences in impulsivity.  
A Model of Impulsive Behavior 
Our model of impulsive behavior begins with the assumption that individuals are 
often faced with two mutually exclusive options. The impulsive choice brings immediate 
gratification with deferred negative consequences (e.g., eating a big piece of chocolate 
cake right now brings immediate pleasure but also regret and worse health later on), 
whereas the self-controlled choice brings greater utility but only after some delay (e.g., 
not eating the cake brings no pleasure now but better physical health later on). Deciding 
between indulgence and abstinence requires a subjective evaluation of the gratification 
associated with the choice as well as some consideration of the attendant long-term 
consequences (i.e., harm). 
We propose that subjective temptation and perceived harm are psychologically 
meaningful aspects of impulsive behavior that can explain domain-specificity. 
Specifically, we suggest that both subjective temptation and perceived harm are domain-
specific, whereas willpower resources and strategies are domain-general.
3
 Consistent 
with the empirical work by Baumeister and colleagues, we assume the processes that 
underpin the inhibition of impulses to rely on resources that are finite and therefore 
                                                            
3 Our model is inspired by research on domain-specificity in risk-taking by Weber and colleagues (Weber, 
Blais, & Betz, 2002). Like most traits, risk aversion has traditionally been assumed by economists and 
psychologists alike to be domain-general, despite abundant empirical evidence that risk-taking behavior 
varies across domains (e.g., MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990). Weber and colleagues (2002) found that 
“domain differences in apparent risk taking seem to be associated primarily with differences in the 
perception of the activities’ benefits and risks” (p. 282). 
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judiciously allocated. The “cost” of resisting any temptation can be dramatically reduced 
by cognitive and behavioral strategies (e.g., mental transformation). Thus, our model 
predicts both domain-general and domain-specific variance in impulsive behavior. 
Individuals who are more self-controlled, generally, than others have more self-control 
resources to deploy and more effective strategies for reducing the cost of resisting 
temptation. Consequently, their overall level of impulsive behavior will be lower than 
their less self-controlled peers (see Figure 1a). In contrast, an individual’s observed 
behavior will vary across domains as a function of his or her idiosyncratic, domain-
specific subjective evaluations of temptation and perceived harm (see Figure 1b). 
Returning to our early example, Tiger Woods might have prodigious self-control 
resources and effective strategies for reducing the cost of resisting temptation. But, 
relative to other temptations that Woods did successfully resist, the particular 
improprieties which were Wood’s undoing must have elicited exceptionally strong urges 
and/or been evaluated as benign. 
Our model is consistent with Hofmann, Friese, and Strack’s (2009) dual-system 
model of self-control where self-control outcomes (i.e., impulsive behavior) are predicted 
by impulsive precursors (e.g., temptation) and reflective precursors (e.g., perceived 
harm). In their model, the impulsive system does not only produce impulses that lead to 
detrimental behavior. Some impulses (e.g., drinking water when one is thirsty) are 
aligned with the reflective system. In addition, impulsive behavior may consist of 
inaction (e.g., procrastinating or not exercising), and the reflective system may be 
required to override the impulse to be inactive. Their model also predicts that “boundary 
conditions” (e.g., domain-general self-control) moderate the effects of impulsive and 
 
 
10 
 
reflective precursors on behavior. Research applying their model has focused on between-
individual differences within a domain, whereas our investigation focuses on within-
individual differences across domains. 
Our model is also consistent with Fleeson’s (2001) density distribution approach. 
From this perspective, traits can be thought of as density distributions of states, which are 
characterized by distribution moments (e.g., mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis). As a 
resolution to the person-situation debate, Fleeson demonstrated that “trait concepts are 
inclusive of both impressive levels of within-person stability and impressive levels of 
within-person variability” (p. 1011). Specifically, he showed that while marked within-
individual variance exists (and single states demonstrate relatively low test-retest 
stability), their means are highly stable (rs > .90). Relevant to the current investigation, 
Fleeson makes a distinction between structural and process approaches: “The structural 
approach emphasizes broad tendencies that are manifest in stable and situation-
independent behavioral averages. The process approach emphasizes laws relating 
situational conditions to individuals' behavioral reactions…The structural approach can 
focus on correlates of highly reliable means, and the process approach can explain the 
plentiful deviations from these means” (p. 1023). Our model encompasses and applies 
both of these approaches.  
The Present Studies 
The goals of this investigation were to 1) substantiate distinct domains of 
impulsive behavior and 2) explain within-individual variance across domains as a 
function of the subjective temptation and perceived harm of impulsive behavior. In Study 
1a, we developed the Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale (DSIS), administered the DSIS 
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to a large sample of undergraduates, and conducted exploratory factor analyses to assess 
the dimensionality of the scale. In Study 1b, we refined the DSIS and conducted 
confirmatory factor analyses on a national Internet sample of adults. In Study 2, we tested 
the hypothesis that variance in domain-specific impulsive behavior could be explained by 
temptation and perceived harm. In Study 3, we used targeted subsamples to confirm that 
individuals who are highly tempted in one domain (e.g., dieters in the food domain) are 
only moderately tempted in other domains (e.g., impulse shoppers in the finance domain). 
Study 1a 
In Study 1a, we developed and validated a novel self-report questionnaire of 
domain-specific impulsive behavior. We used exploratory factor analyses to test the 
hypothesis that impulsive behavior is multi-dimensional. To establish convergent 
validity, we analyzed correlations between impulsive behavior in each domain and a 
domain-general self-control scale, and to test criterion-related validity, we conducted 
multiple regression analyses predicting measures of academic achievement, positive 
social relations, physical health, and facets of impulsivity from domain-specific 
impulsive behavior. 
We predicted that (1) exploratory factor analyses would produce domain-specific 
factors; (2) impulsive behavior within each domain would show convergent validity with 
a widely-used self-control scale (i.e., negatively correlated); (3) domain-specific 
impulsive behavior would show convergent validity with outcomes theoretically 
predicted to vary with specific domains (e.g., work with GPA); (4) domain-specific 
impulsive behavior would provide incremental predictive validity over domain-general 
self-control in predicting theoretically-relevant outcomes; and (5) the variance in domain-
 
 
12 
 
specific impulsive behavior within individuals will be significantly larger than domain-
general impulsive behavior between individuals.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred ninety-three undergraduate students enrolled in 
psychology courses at a large, private university participated in this study for research 
experience credit (M = 19.5 years, SD = 1.3; 56.6% women). Approximately 64.5% of 
the participants were Caucasian, 18.1% were Asian, 5.5% were Latino, 4.4% were Black, 
and 7.5% were either of mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds. 
Procedure and measures. We posted this study online and advertised it on the 
psychology department’s subject pool website as a survey of personality and behavior. 
To obviate order effects, we randomized the sequence of DSIS items for each participant. 
In addition to the DSIS items, participants completed a domain-general measure of self-
control and answered questions about their physical health, social relationships, 
demographic characteristics, and GPA. 
Domain-specific impulsive behavior. Sixty-eight items were generated in ten 
domains of impulsivity: alcohol, emotion, exercise, finance, food, relationship, media, 
sex, smoking, and work. We generated items through focus groups instructed to nominate 
behaviors that reflect impulsivity or self-control and, in addition, by examining existing 
measures of impulsivity and self-control (e.g., Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Although we strived to include a broad sample, the items in 
this investigation were not an exhaustive set of impulsive behaviors. For instance, road 
rage and speeding are not represented. However, exhaustive coverage was not necessary 
for our goals of (1) demonstrating that impulsive behavior varies across domains and (2) 
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examining potential explanations for domain-specificity. The DSIS instructed 
participants to “indicate the likelihood of engaging in the following” on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 = Very unlikely to 5 = Very likely (see Appendix for the full set of 
instructions). 
Domain-general self-control. The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS; Tangney, et 
al., 2004) is a 13-item self-report questionnaire. Participants rated how well each item 
(e.g., “I am good at resisting temptation.”) described them on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me. The observed internal reliability 
was .84. 
Health and positive social relations. We included three questions to assess 
physical health—“I am healthy,” “I am in great physical shape,” and “Physically, I feel 
great”—and three questions to assess positive social relations—“People like me,” “I have 
a lot of friends,” and “I get along well with others.” These items were rated on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 = Strong disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. The three health items had 
an internal reliability coefficient of .86, and the three social relations items had an 
internal reliability coefficient of .83. 
Facets of impulsivity. The Urgency, (lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) 
Perseverance, and Sensation Seeking (UPPS) scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) is a 45-
item self-report questionnaire. Participants rated how well each item described them on a 
5-point scale ranging from 1 = Not at all like me to 5 = Very much like me. Example 
items include “I have trouble controlling my impulses” for the Urgency subscale, “I 
usually think carefully before doing anything” for the (lack of) Premeditation subscale, “I 
finish what I start” for the (lack of) Perseverance subscale, and “I generally seek new and 
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exciting experiences and sensations” for the Sensation Seeking subscale. The observed 
internal reliabilities ranged from .85 to .91. 
Results and Discussion 
Exploratory factor analysis. We reduced the number of items to 50 (see Table 1 
for the final set of items) by removing items that either had less than a .40 corrected item-
total correlation within their subscale or were theoretically expected to load in more than 
one domain (e.g., “watching pornographic movies” was related to both sex and media). 
Exploratory factor analyses on this set of 50 items suggested six domain-specific factors, 
which were interpretable as impulsive behavior in the work, relationship, drug, food, 
exercise, and finance domains. We used the squared multiple correlation (SMC) method 
to compute the prior communality estimates, set the factor loading criteria at .40, and 
used an orthogonal varimax rotation. We used a combination of scree and parallel tests, 
the Kaiser criterion, the Minimum Average Partial (MAP) criterion, and interpretability 
of the factors to determine the number of factors to extract. The final solution is shown in 
Table 1, and subscale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations are in Table 2.
4
 
DSIS convergent, criterion, and incremental predictive validity. As predicted, 
domain-general self-control was significantly negatively correlated with impulsive 
behavior within each of the six domains, rs from -.26 to -.64, ps < .001. (see Table 2). We 
also predicted that impulsive work behavior would correlate negatively with GPA, 
impulsive relationship behavior would correlate negatively with social relations, and 
                                                            
4 We Winsorized (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008) subscale (e.g., food behavior subscale) and outcome 
(e.g., GPA) distributions by replacing outliers, defined as scores greater than 3.29 standard deviations from 
the mean, with the closest score that was not greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean (<1% of 
the scores; a z-value of 3.29 corresponds to a two-tailed p-value of .01). Kline (2005) noted that absolute 
values of the skew index greater than 3.0 is considered extreme and that a kurtosis index greater than 10.0 
may suggest a problem. All of the subscales and outcomes had skew and kurtosis indices that were less 
than 2.0. 
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impulsive (lack of) exercise and food behavior would correlate negatively with health. As 
shown in Table 2, the results supported our predictions Overall, domain-specific 
impulsivity scores predicted these theoretically-related outcomes (average r = -.25) better 
than they predicted theoretically-unrelated outcomes (average r = -.09).
5
 
Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the DSIS subscales provided 
incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting 
theoretically relevant outcomes in three out of four analyses. The domain-specific food, β 
= -.16, part r = -.16, p < .01, exercise, β = -.44, part r = -.40, p < .001, and relationship 
subscales, β = -.15, part r = -.13, p < .05, provided incremental predictive validity over 
domain-general self-control in predicting health (for the food and exercise domains) and 
positive social relations (for the relation domain). The work subscale did not provide 
incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in predicting GPA, β = -
.01, part r = -.01, ns. This occurred because of the relatively large amount of variance 
shared between the work subscale and the self-control scale (r² = .41). Indeed, several 
items on the self-control scale relate directly to work (e.g., “I am lazy”) and the work 
subscale had the highest correlation (r = -.64) with the self-control scale.
6
 
DSIS correspondence with UPPS. Domain-specific impulsive behavior 
demonstrated theoretically-predicted relationships with facets of impulsivity. We 
predicted that UPPS Urgency would be associated with impulsive interpersonal, drug, 
food, and finance behavior because urgency involves impulses (such as for saying things 
                                                            
5 These averages were computed by using Fisher’s r to z formula to convert rs to zs, averaging the zs, then 
converting the average zs back to rs. By “larger,” we are referring to the point estimates. We are not aware 
of an inferential test that can compare average rs computed with the same variables within the same 
sample. However, in this sample, a correlation of r = .25 is significant at p < .001, whereas a correlation of 
r = .09 is not significant. 
6 The participants, being students, may have considered the work domain to exemplify impulsivity because 
schoolwork is salient. As a result, they may have subjectively overemphasized the work domain when 
rating the domain-general items (e.g., “I wish I had more self-discipline”). 
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and buying things on impulse) and cravings (such as for food and drugs). We predicted 
that UPPS (lack of) Premeditation would be associated with interpersonal and finance 
behavior because premeditation involves thinking carefully before saying things and 
planning for the future. We predicted that UPPS Perseverance would be associated with 
work and exercise behavior because perseverance is necessary to finish arduous and 
boring work tasks as well as many forms of exercise. Finally, we predicted that UPPS 
Sensation Seeking would be associated with drug behavior because drug use has been 
connected with sensation seeking (Donohew et al., 1999; Robbins & Bryan, 2004). As 
shown in Table 2, the results supported our predictions. Overall, UPPS subscales 
predicted theoretically-related DSIS subscales (average r = .29) better than they predicted 
theoretically-unrelated DSIS subscales (average r = .10). 
Hierarchical linear model. A hierarchical linear model (HLM; estimated with 
the program HLM 6.08) revealed that the variance in domain-specific impulsive behavior 
within individuals was significantly larger than domain-general impulsive behavior 
between individuals.
7
 At Level 1, the outcome variable was the domain-specific behavior 
subscales of the DSIS, with six measures (one for each domain) nested within each 
participant (N = 293) for a total of 1,758 data points. Participants were the level-two 
units. In this unconditional (i.e., no predictor/s) model, behavior in domain d for 
                                                            
7 Comparing variance components at different levels is one of the main applications of multilevel analyses 
(Bickel, 2007; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003). The interpretation is equivalent to 
thinking about variance partitioning in a between-subjects ANOVA: is there more variance between groups 
vs. within-groups? Imagine that 99% of the variance in impulsive behavior were within individuals across 
domains, and only 1% were between individuals. This would suggest that most of the variance in impulsive 
behavior is across domains (i.e., an individual can be highly impulsive in one domain but not in others) and 
that there is relatively little variance between individuals (i.e., it doesn’t make sense to say that one 
individual is generally more impulsive than another). Conversely, if we had found that 1% of the variance 
were within-individuals across domains, and 99% were between individuals, then that would suggest that 
impulsive behavior for a particular individual does not vary across domains (i.e., if an individual is 
impulsive in one domain, then s/he is impulsive in others as well), but there are reliable differences in 
impulsivity among individuals (i.e., if an individual is impulsive, then s/he is generally more impulsive in 
all domains compared to other individuals). 
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individual i (Ydi) is a function of the grand mean (γ00), deviation from the grand mean by 
individual i (ζ0i), and deviation from individual i’s mean (β0i) by domain d (εdi). 
Level 1 – Within individual:  Ydi = π0i + εdi         (1a) 
Level 2 – Between individual: π0i = β00 + ζ0i         (1b) 
Combined model:   Ydi = β00 + ζ0i + εdi        (1c) 
The within-individual variance in impulsive behavior across domains (.68; 79% of the 
total variance) was significantly larger than the between-individual variance (.18; 21% of 
the total variance; F(1465,292) = 3.79, p < .001), which indicates that most of the 
variance in impulsive behavior is within individuals and provides further evidence that 
impulsive behavior is domain-specific. 
Study 1b 
Study 1a provided preliminary support for distinct domains of impulsive 
behavior. In Study 1b, we replicated and extended our findings in a large sample of adults 
recruited through the Internet. We revised the DSIS instructions so that participants were 
asked to “indicate how often you do the following” on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = 
Never to 5 = Very often instead of the more hypothetical “indicate the likelihood of 
engaging in the following.” We revised the DSIS so that the remaining items represented 
more concrete or observable behavior (e.g., we removed “Envying Others” and revised 
“Being greedy” to “Taking more than my fair share (i.e., being greedy)”), were less 
ambiguous (e.g., we changed “Telling secrets” to “Telling another person’s secret”), and 
were less complex (e.g., we changed “Being sedentary instead of exercising” to “Being 
sedentary”). When possible, we revised common initial verbs (e.g., “eating” for the food 
items) to decrease inflated common source variance. In order to reduce social desirability 
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effects, we made an effort to revise or remove items that had negative connotations (e.g., 
“Behaving inappropriately when I am emotional” was removed); admittedly, this attempt 
was not fully successful as several items that could be construed as negative were 
retained (e.g., “Lying” and “Procrastinating”). Finally, we added three new items to the 
relationship domain, two to the finance domain, and one to the drug domain to increase 
internal reliability. The full set of revised items is presented in the Table 3. 
Method 
Participants. Fourteen hundred eighty-six adults participated in this study (M = 
41.1 years, SD = 12.7; 79.2% women). Approximately 79.9% of the participants were 
Caucasian, 7.5% were Asian, 5% were Latino, 3.6% were Black, and 4% were either of 
mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds.  
Procedure and measures. We posted this study online and set up a link on the 
www.authentichappiness.com website inviting visitors to participate in research on 
domain-specific self-control. This noncommercial website provides free information 
about psychology research, access to self-report measures, and opportunities to 
participate in research. To obviate order effects, the sequence of DSIS items were 
randomized for each participant. In addition to the DSIS items, participants filled out the 
BSCS (observed α = .83) and a demographic questionnaire, which included items about 
gender, ethnicity, year of birth, height, and weight. We used the height and weight 
information to compute Body Mass Index (BMI) scores. 
Results and Discussion 
Confirmatory factor analyses. We used confirmatory factor analysis to compare 
the fit of a domain-specific six-factor model to a domain-general one-factor model. In the 
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six-factor model, items were allowed to load freely on their respective factor (domain), 
the factor loadings with other factors were set to zero, and the covariances among the 
factors were freely estimated (see Table 3). In the one-factor model, all items were 
allowed to load freely on a single factor. In both models, the factors were scaled by 
setting the variance to equal 1.0. 
A chi-square difference test indicated that the domain-specific six-factor model fit 
the data better than the domain-general one-factor model, χ²(15, N = 1486) = 15,389.39, p 
< .001. Fit indices suggested an adequate fit to the data for the six-factor CFA model: 
χ²(1209, N = 1486) = 7,740.65, p < .001; RMSEA = .060 (90% confidence interval = .059 
to .062); CFI = .82; and SRMR= .06 (see Kline, 2005 for a discussion of fit indices).
8
 All 
of the fit statistics were substantially worse in the one-factor CFA model: χ²(1224, N = 
1486) = 23,130.04, p < .001; RMSEA = .11 (90% confidence interval = .109 to .111); 
CFI = .40; and SRMR = .11.  
DSIS convergent, criterion, and incremental predictive validity. Domain-
general self-control was negatively correlated with impulsive behavior in each of the six 
domains (see Table 4). Food and (lack of) exercise domain-specific impulsivity scores 
predicted BMI (average r = .38) better than theoretically-unrelated domain-specific 
scores (average r = .06). Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the food, β = .34, 
part r = .32, p < .001, and (lack of) exercise, β = .35, part r = .31, p < .001, DSIS 
subscales provided incremental predictive validity over domain-general self-control in 
predicting BMI. 
                                                            
8 CFI values over .90 indicate a good fit; however, Kenny and McCoach (2003) note that “the CFI tend[s] 
to demonstrate worse fit as the number of variables in the model increases…Therefore, it appears that the 
CFI…do[es] not function well with correctly specified models that include a large number of variables” (p. 
349). Kenny and McCoach’s “large” model had 40 variables; the current model had 51. 
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Hierarchical linear model. The within-individual variance in impulsive behavior 
across domains (.68; 88% of the total variance) was significantly larger than the between-
individual variance (.09; 12% of the total variance; F(7430,1485) = 7.48, p < .001), 
which again indicates that most of the variance in impulsive behavior is within 
individuals. 
Study 2 
Studies 1a and 1b provided evidence for distinct domains of impulsive behavior. 
In Study 2, we tested our theory that within-individual differences in domain-specific 
impulsive behaviors could be largely explained by domain-specific differences in their 
subjective temptation and perceived harm. In addition, we tested the hypothesis that 
individual-differences in the effects of temptation and perceived harm would predict 
individual differences in within-individual variability in domain-specific behavior. As 
Fleeson (2001) explains, “being sensitive to the cues for a particular trait would result in 
the individual acting more variably on that trait, in particular. That is, a person whose 
actions differ from each other on a trait may be a person who responds strongly to the 
momentary cues for that trait” (p. 1014). He goes on to say, “If within-person variability 
in behavior is partially due to sensitivity to trait-relevant cues, then individual differences 
in within-person variability may be due to individual differences in sensitivity to trait-
relevant cues” (p. 1019). In addition to sensitivity to cues (i.e., the individual-specific 
effects of temptation and perceived harm), we also predicted that within-individual 
variability in domain-specific temptation and perceived harm as well as their interactions 
with their effects (e.g., individual-specific effects of temptation with within-individual 
variability in domain-specific temptation) would predict within-individual variability in 
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domain-specific impulsive behavior. The rationale is that if within-individual variability 
in domain-specific impulsive behavior is due to corresponding variability in temptation 
and perceived harm, then individual differences in the effects of temptation and perceived 
harm, within-individual variability in temptation and perceived harm, and the variability 
by effect interactions should predict within-individual variability in domain-specific 
impulsive behavior. 
Method 
Participants. Three hundred fifty-three undergraduate students enrolled in 
psychology courses at a large, private university participated in this study for research 
experience credit (M = 20.3 years, SD = 2.7; 64.6% women). Approximately 59.8% of 
the participants were Caucasian, 19.8% were Asian, 5.9% were Latino, 4.8% were Black, 
and 9.7% were either of mixed or of other ethnic backgrounds. 
Procedure and measures. We posted this study online and advertised it on the 
psychology department’s subject pool website as a survey of personality and behavior. 
To avoid order effects, we randomized the sequence of DSIS items within each scale for 
each participant. In addition to the DSIS items, participants filled out the BSCS described 
in Study 1a and a demographic questionnaire. 
We used the DSIS revision described in Study 1b in this study. However, in 
addition to the behavior scale (DSIS-B), the same set of 51 DSIS items was presented 
two more times with different prompts each time to gauge temptation and perceived 
harm. For the temptation scale (DSIS-T), participants were asked to “please rate how 
tempted you would be to do the following” on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = Not 
tempted at all to 5 = Very tempting. For the perceived-harm scale (DSIS-H), participants 
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were asked to “rate how bad you think the following activities are” on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 = Not bad at all to 5 = Very bad. See Appendix for the full set of 
instructions and anchors. Alphas ranged from .81 to .94, average = .88. 
Results and Discussion 
Confirmatory factor analyses. A chi-square difference test indicated that the 
domain-specific six-factor model of impulsive behavior fit the data better than did the 
domain-general one-factor model, χ²(15, N = 353) = 4,003.99, p < .001. Fit indices 
suggested adequate fit to the data for the six-factor model: χ²(1209, N = 353) = 3,054.44, 
p < .001; RMSEA = .066 (90% confidence interval = .063 to .069); CFI = .80; and 
SRMR= .07. The fit statistics were substantially worse in the one-factor model: χ²(1224, 
N = 353) = 7,058.43, p < .001; RMSEA = .116 (90% confidence interval = .114 to .119); 
CFI = .36; and SRMR = .13.  
Hierarchical Linear Models. Hierarchical linear models  revealed that the 
variance in domain-specific impulsive behavior within individuals was significantly 
larger than domain-general impulsive behavior between individuals and that temptation 
predicted substantially more unique variance in within-individual domain-specific 
impulsive behavior than did perceived harm, although both were significant predictors. 
We first fit an unconditional model to (Model 1) to provide an estimate of the proportion 
of total variance within and between individuals in impulsive behavior and serve as a 
baseline model to compare the reduction in variance among the more complex models. 
Subsequent models examined the amount of within-individual variance in impulsive 
behavior across domains explained by temptation (Model 2), perceived harm (Model 3), 
and temptation and perceived harm (Model 4). In Model 5, we added domain-general 
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self-control as a Level 2 predictor to explain between-individual variance in domain-
general impulsive behavior and to examine whether domain-general self-control 
moderated the within-individual effects of temptation and perceived harm. We 
individual-mean centered the Level 1 predictors and grand-mean centered the Level 2 
predictors (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002 for a discussion of centering).  
Model 1 (see equations 1a-1c and Table 6) revealed that the within-individual 
variance in impulsive behavior across domains (.54; 87% of the total variance) was 
significantly larger than the between-individual variance (.08; 13% of the total variance; 
F(1765,352) = 6.78, p < .001). 
In Model 2, we included temptation as a Level 1 predictor of impulsive behavior 
to examine the amount of variance explained by temptation alone. 
Level 1 – Within individual:  Ydi = π0i + π1i(Temptation) + εdi      (2a) 
Level 2 – Between individual: π0i = β00 + ζ0i              (2b) 
      π1i = β10 + ζ1i              (2c) 
  
Combined model: Ydi = β00 + β10(Temptation)        (2d) 
        + ζ0i + ζ1i(Temptation) + εdi 
The pseudo-R²ε (see Singer & Willett, 2003) was .57, which indicated that adding 
temptation as a Level 1 predictor accounted for 57% of the within-individual variance in 
impulsive behavior across domains. This model also provided an estimate of the average 
slope (across individuals) of temptation: .58, t(352) = 32.15, p < .001, reffect = .86.
9
 
                                                            
9 Following Karney and Bradbury (1997), we used the following formula to compute the effect-size 
correlations: reffect = √[t²/(t² + df)]. 
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In Model 3, we removed temptation and added perceived harm as a Level 1 
predictor of impulsive behavior. 
Level 1 – Within individual:  Ydi = π0i + π1i(Perceived harm) + εdi      (3a) 
Level 2 – Between individual: π0i = β00 + ζ0i             (3b) 
      π1i = β10 + ζ1i             (3c)  
Combined model: Ydi = β00 + β10(Perceived harm)        (3d) 
        + ζ0i + ζ1i(Perceived harm) + εdi 
The pseudo-R²ε was .19, and the estimated average slope (across individuals) of 
perceived harm was -.35, t(352) = -11.54, p < .001, reffect = -.52. 
In Model 4, we added temptation and perceived harm simultaneously as Level 1 
predictors of impulsive behavior. 
Level 1 – Within individual:  Ydi = π0i + π1i(Temptation)       (4a) 
        + π2i(Perceived harm) + εdi 
Level 2 – Between individual: π0i = β00 + ζ0i             (4b) 
      π1i = β10 + ζ1i             (4c) 
       π2i = β20 + ζ2i             
(4d)  
Combined model: Ydi = β00 + β10(Temptation) + β20(Perceived harm)      (4e) 
+ ζ0i + ζ1i(Temptation) + ζ2i(Perceived harm) + εdi 
The pseudo-R²ε was .59. Temptation and perceived harm explained 40% and 2% of the 
unique within-individual variance in impulsive behavior, respectively. The average 
slopes (across individuals) of temptation controlling for perceived harm, and perceived 
harm controlling for temptation were .53, t(352) = 27.69, p < .001, reffect = .83, and -.10, 
 
 
25 
 
t(352) = -4.82, p < .001, reffect = -.25, respectively. The variance components for the 
slopes of temptation (.05, χ²(344) = 570.24, p < .001) and perceived harm (.03, χ²(344) = 
396.70, p = .026) suggested that the effects of temptation and perceived harm ranged 
from about .09 to .98 and -.45 to .24, respectively, for 95% of the participants. 
Temptation was a significantly better predictor than perceived harm, t(352) = 19.05, p < 
.001. 
In Model 5, we added self-control as a Level 2 predictor of the intercept, 
temptation slope, and perceived harm slope. Because the Level 1 predictors were 
individual-mean centered, the Level 1 intercept represented each individual’s average (or 
domain-general) level of impulsive behavior. 
Level 1 – Within individual:  Ydi = π0i + π1i(Temptation)       (5a) 
        + π2i(Perceived harm) + εdi 
Level 2 – Between individual: π0i = β00 + β01(Self-control) + ζ0i         (5b) 
      π1i = β10 + β11(Self-control) + ζ1i         (5c) 
       π2i = β20 + β21(Self-control) + ζ2i (5d)  
Combined model: Ydi = β00 + β10(Temptation) + β20(Perceived harm)      (5e) 
+ β01(Self-control) + β11(Self-control x Temptation)  
+ β21(Self-control x Perceived harm) + ζ0i + ζ1i(Temptation) 
+ ζ2i(Perceived harm) + εdi 
The pseudo-R²ζ0 indicated that adding self-control as a Level 2 predictor of the Level 1 
intercept accounted for approximately 40% of the domain-general variance in impulsive 
behavior between individuals. The slope of self-control was -.49, t(351) = -18.84, p < 
.001, reffect = -.71. As predicted, between-individual domain-general self-control 
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moderated the within-individual effects of temptation, -.08, t(351) = -2.37, p < .05, reffect 
= -.13, and perceived harm, -.19, t(351) = -5.90, p < .001, reffect = -.30, on impulsive 
behavior, indicating that temptation has less of an effect and perceived harm has a greater 
effect on impulsive behavior for individuals with more self-control. More specifically, 
these cross-level interactions indicate that the effects of temptation and perceived harm 
are .45 and -.30, respectively, for individuals who are one point above the mean on self-
control, whereas the same effects are .61 and .08 for individuals one point below the 
mean. Pseudo-R²ζ1 and Pseudo-R²ζ2 indicated that adding self-control as a Level 2 
predictor of the Level 1 temptation and perceived harm slopes explained about 6% and 
46% of the between-individual variance of the within-individual effects of temptation and 
perceived harm, respectively. 
 Finally, we tested our hypothesized predictors of individual differences in within-
individual variability in domain-specific behavior. In Step 1 of a hierarchical regression 
analysis, the effects of temptation (β = .66, p < .001) and perceived harm (β = .18, p < 
.001) as well as within-individual variability in domain-specific temptation (β = .44, p < 
.001) and perceived harm (β = .12, p = .001) predicted individual differences in within-
individual variability in domain-specific behavior.
10
 In Step 2, the temptation effect by 
temptation variability interaction (β = .07, p = .064) and the perceived harm effect by 
perceived harm variability interaction (β = .08, p = .02) were added and found to be 
marginally significant and significant, respectively.  
Study 3 
                                                            
10 We took the empirical Bayes residuals for the temptation and perceived harm slopes, added the 
corresponding estimated slopes, and used the absolute values as individual-specific effects. We used the 
within-individual standard deviations for domain-specific impulsive behavior, temptation, and perceived 
harm as measures of within-individual variability. 
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Collectively, the first three studies provided evidence for both domain-specific 
and domain-general aspects of impulsive behavior. In Study 2, we found evidence that 
individuals vary dramatically in their ability to exercise self-control across domains 
primarily because they find some activities more tempting than others. To confirm the 
hypothesis that temptation is highly domain-specific (i.e., what is tempting to one 
individual can hold no appeal whatsoever to another), in Study 3, inspired by Hanoch, 
Johnson, and Wilke’s (2006) study on domain specificity in participant recruitment, we 
recruited targeted subsamples from www.facebook.com, a social networking website. 
Facebook is a free online community with over 200 million users that provides its 
members with tools for interacting with friends, colleagues, and family members. In 
addition, it allows members to connect with other individuals who share specific common 
interests through 30 million special interest groups. Members can find and join groups by 
searching their names and descriptions using key words or phrases. We expected 
members of targeted interest groups to deem relevant temptations to be particularly 
attractive or enjoyable. For instance, shopaholics should be more tempted to engage in 
impulse buying but not more tempted to drink or avoid exercise. 
In sum, we hypothesized that (1) targeted subsamples would be more tempted in 
the hypothesized domain relative to the other groups, and (2) subsamples would not differ 
in their overall levels of temptation. In addition to providing further evidence for 
convergent and discriminant validity, this study is noteworthy in that it examines real-
world behavior (i.e., membership in domain-specific groups), uses a diverse sample (i.e., 
not just college students), and demonstrates the utility of using the Internet for 
psychological research. 
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Method 
Participants. Four hundred nineteen adult participants (M = 25.1 years, SD = 8.1; 
77% women) were recruited from the work domain (n = 152), the food domain (n = 61), 
the finance domain (n = 102), the drug and alcohol domain (n = 78), and the exercise 
domain (n = 26). 
Procedure and measures. We used key words and phrases to identify special 
interest groups in five domains:
11
 work (e.g., “Experts of Procrastination”), food (e.g., 
“Binge Eating Group”), finance (e.g., “Addicted to Shopping”), drug and alcohol (e.g., 
“Wreckless Drinking”), and exercise (e.g., “I Hate Exercise”). Key terms used to identify 
special interest groups included the following–work:  procrastinators, procrastination; 
food: dieters, binge eaters, weight loss, I love eating, I eat too much; finance: 
shopaholics, shopping addiction, I love shopping; drug and alcohol: alcoholics, drinking, 
binge drinking, alcohol, beer, shots, black out; and exercise: exercise, fitness, couch 
potato. Once special interest groups were identified, we contacted the group 
administrators for permission to invite their members to participate in our study. Group 
administrators either forwarded our invitation or let us message their members directly. 
We invited members to participate in our study “on personality, lifestyle, and behavior” 
and directed them to five separate (but identical) websites.
12
 Importantly, we did not 
mention in our invitation or on the study website itself our interest in domain-specificity 
                                                            
11 We could not find groups representing relationship impulsive behavior using the following keywords: 
temper, lying, anger management. 
12
 Because participation was anonymous, we cannot not rule out the possibility that participants were in 
more than one group. However, the probability of the same Facebook members being in more than one 
group seems reasonably low, given that Facebook had over 200 million members at the time of data 
collection. 
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or impulsivity per se. Participants completed the DSIS-T scale, as well as a demographics 
questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion 
As predicted, within each domain, the target group was more tempted to engage 
in domain-specific impulsive behavior relative to the other groups but not more tempted 
overall. Specifically, a 5 (domain) x 5 (group) mixed-design ANOVA predicting 
temptation revealed a significant main effect for domain, F(4, 1656) = 126.04, p < .001, 
and a significant domain by group interaction, F(16, 1656) = 12.76, p < .001, but no 
effect for group, F(4, 414) = 1.15, p = .33. As summarized in Figure 2 and Tables 7 and 
8, the differences between target groups and other groups were all significant and ranged 
from small to large in effect size. Overall, these results suggest that individuals are in 
“impulsive-problem” groups because of domain-specific temptation. 
General Discussion 
 This investigation presents support for our proposed model of impulsivity. Some 
individuals are more impulsive than others on average, and the tendency to be impulsive 
in one domain (e.g., finances) correlates with the tendency to be impulsive in other 
domains (e.g., food and drugs). But, it is also true that any given individual varies 
dramatically in how gratifying he or she finds particular activities, and consequently, in 
the relative frequency with which he or she indulges in them. In contrast, within-
individual differences in the perceived harm associated with indulging explain only 
minimal unique variance in within-individual differences in impulsive behavior. 
Moreover, as predicted, temptation has less of an effect on individuals who were more 
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self-controlled than others in general, and these individuals were also less likely to 
engage in behaviors deemed harmful.  
When submitted to exploratory factor analyses, the scale we developed for this 
investigation produced distinct, interpretable factors. Likewise, domain-specific 
confirmatory factor models fit the data better than did domain-general (i.e., one factor) 
models of impulsive behavior. The DSIS subscales demonstrated convergent validity 
with a widely-used domain-general measure of self-control and incremental predictive 
validity above and beyond this domain-general measure for theoretically-relevant 
outcomes (e.g., impulsive behavior in the food domain predicted BMI over and beyond a 
domain-general self-control questionnaire). Finally in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, the within-
individual variance in impulsive behavior across domains (i.e., domain-specific behavior) 
was significantly larger than the domain-general variance across individuals. 
Individuals behaved more impulsively in domains that they found tempting and, 
to a much lesser extent, resisted vices they perceived as harmful. Specifically, temptation 
and perceived harm together explained 59% of the within-individual variance across 
domains, whereas temptation explained 40% of the unique variance compared to 2% for 
perceived harm. On its own, temptation explained most of the variance (57%) in domain-
specific impulsive behavior. As predicted by Hofmann et al.’s (2009) model, temptation 
had a weaker effect and perceived harm had a stronger effect for individuals with higher 
self-control. That is, more self-controlled individuals are better at overcoming their 
idiosyncratic temptations and refraining from behaviors they deem harmful. Finally, 
consistent with the idea that domain-specific impulsive behavior is partially due to 
domain-specific temptation and perceived harm, individuals with greater sensitivity to 
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temptation and perceived harm and who had more variability in domain-specific 
temptation and perceived harm had more variance in impulsive behavior across domains. 
Why does perceived harm account for relatively little variance in impulsive 
behavior? Metcalfe & Mischel (1999) proposed that there are two systems that influence 
impulsivity: a hot emotional system that is fast and reflexive and a cool cognitive system 
that is slow and reflective. Visceral hot influences can have powerful effects that 
overwhelm the cool system (Loewenstein, 1996). If temptation reflects the hot system 
and perceived harm reflects the cool system, then temptation may have a greater 
influence on impulsive behavior than does perceived harm. Another explanation is that 
individuals may generally be more consistent in evaluating harm versus temptation. Thus, 
there may be relatively little variance in perceived harm to explain variance in impulsive 
behavior. Indeed, in Study 2, estimates for the within-individual variance across domains 
were .82 for temptation and .46 for perceived harm (in separate unconditional HLM 
models with temptation and perceived harm as outcomes; results not reported). 
Our findings are consistent with recent research on domain-specificity in risk-
taking by Weber and colleagues (Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber, et al., 2002). Like most 
traits, risk aversion has traditionally been assumed by economists to be domain-general, 
despite evidence that risk-taking behavior varies across domains (e.g., MacCrimmon & 
Wehrung, 1990). Weber and colleagues (2002) found that “domain differences in 
apparent risk taking seem to be associated primarily with differences in the perception of 
the activities’ benefits and risks” (p. 282). Notably, Weber and colleagues found content 
domains of risk that did not correspond with our domains of impulsivity. This suggests 
that impulsivity and risk do not conform to universal “life domains.” More generally, we 
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speculate that psychologically meaningful boundaries that demarcate domains vary 
across personality traits. 
While it is possible that domain-specific impulse-control systems or the 
opportunity to engage in impulsive behavior explains domain-specificity, this study 
suggests that domain-general self-control combined with domain-specific temptation (and 
other potential factors) can give rise to domain-specific impulsive behavior. This is 
congruent with Mischel’s (1973) proposal that an individual’s “inconsistent” behavior 
across domains is a function of the individual’s construal of the situation. If an individual 
subjectively perceives temptation to be high (or harm to be low), then that individual is 
more likely to engage in impulsive behavior. 
Limitations 
We see four limitations of the current investigation. First, we relied exclusively on 
self-report questionnaires, which are susceptible to response biases, such as social 
desirability and acquiescence (Paulhus, 1991). Although these biases could inflate 
correlations between scales, they could also increase the difficulty of finding distinct 
factors as EFA depends on differential variance. A related issue is that the relationship 
between self-report behavior and attitudes may be spuriously inflated (Bem, 1967). For 
example, if an individual says that she eats fried food often, and then is asked if she likes 
fried food, then she might decide (perhaps unconsciously) that she must like fried food if 
she eats it often. Against this possibility, the construct of self-control (i.e., avoiding 
behaviors one finds tempting but regards as harmful vs. engaging in tempting behaviors 
that are deemed harmful) suggests that individuals can distinguish between temptation, 
perceived harm, and behavior. For instance, one may avoid procrastination yet still be 
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tempted to procrastinate: that is, the temptation and behavior are distinct. Finally, the 
scale anchors (e.g., “very tempting”) were subjective and open to interpretation.13 
Because these are common limitations to questionnaire-based research, further studies 
should investigate domain-specific impulsivity through alternative methods, such as 
using implicit measures to assess temptation. 
The second limitation of this investigation pertains to content-related validity. We 
reiterate that the items in this investigation were not an exhaustive set of impulsive 
behaviors, and thus all possible domains were not included. Because the results of 
exploratory factor analyses are dependent on the included items, researchers with 
different items might obtain different results. Consequently, these results must be 
interpreted with caution as a study using a different set of items might not find coherent 
domain-specific factors. Moreover, the domains included in this investigation may vary 
in their bandwidth and level of specificity. For instance, the work domain may be 
relatively broad whereas exercise may be relatively narrow. One can imagine that the 
work domain may encompass diverse subdomains, such as school, career, and personal 
projects, whereas a domain like exercise may only encompass aerobic and anaerobic 
exercise. In sum, our factors should not be considered a complete taxonomy of domains 
with the same level of bandwidth and specificity. 
Third, while the DSIS items were nominated in focus groups as behaviors 
requiring inhibition, certain items may seem—to some individuals—out of place on an 
                                                            
13 Given the possibility that some participants may implicitly use their own personal minimum and 
maximum as anchors when rating the frequency of their behavior (which could inflate within-individual 
variance), we recruited 106 participants from Amazon.com’s Mturk to complete a version of the DSIS-B 
that asked “How many days out of the last seven days did you do the following activities?” The within-
individual variance across domains (1.40; 62% of the total variance) was still significantly larger than the 
between-individual variance (0.86; 38% of the total variance), F(530,105) = 1.62, p = .001. 
 
 
34 
 
impulsivity scale.  For instance, drinking one glass of red wine may be considered 
healthy. However, many people drink wine for other reasons, and in fact, struggle not to 
drink too much. Consistent with this observation, each of the DSIS subscales was 
significantly inversely correlated with a domain-general self-control scale. Moreover, the 
average temptation rating of 2.75 and perceived harm rating of 3.16 suggests that as a 
group, DSIS items are generally perceived as being moderately tempting and moderately 
bad. In addition, the pattern of results was identical when behavior data points rated as 
“Not Tempting” or “Not Bad at All” were excluded from analyses. Furthermore, it is 
common practice for impulsivity scales to contain items that do not capture impulsivity 
or self-control for all individuals. For example, “I eat healthy foods” for the Self-Control 
Scale (Tangney, et al., 2004), “I make up my mind quickly” on the Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), and “Does the child sit still?” on the Self-
Control Rating Scale (Kendall & Wilcox, 1979). 
 Finally, these studies were cross-sectional and correlational in design. 
Experimental studies that manipulate temptation or perceived harm should be conducted 
to establish causal relationships with impulsive behavior. Future studies should also use 
longitudinal designs to establish true predictive relationships between the DSIS and 
theoretically-relevant behavior. Furthermore, while the cross-level interactions in this 
investigation revealed that more self-controlled individuals are better at overcoming their 
idiosyncratic temptations and refraining from behaviors they deem harmful, our data do 
not allow us to determine how or why this occurs. This finding highlights the importance 
of identifying the specific psychological mechanisms by which impulses are regulated. 
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Implications 
We agree with Epstein and O’Brien (1985) that “behavior is unquestionably to 
some extent general and to some extent specific, and one can choose to study one aspect 
or the other” (p. 513). Unfortunately, researchers most often choose to study the first 
aspect and disregard the latter entirely. As demonstrated in this investigation, examining 
domain-specific aspects of behavior revealed that the influence of context on behavior is 
both substantial and systematic. In addition, domain-specific impulsive behavior 
provided incremental predictive validity in predicting theoretically-relevant outcomes 
over and beyond domain-general self-control. 
Although we place special emphasis on domain-specificity, we do not wish to 
downplay the importance of domain-general processes, nor do we claim that domain-
specific processes are “stronger” than domain-general processes. Indeed, this 
investigation demonstrates the value of domain-general self-control in predicting 
impulsive behavior over a diverse range of domains. Both aspects are important. We 
accentuate the domain-specific aspect because it has largely been ignored. Although 
interest in domain-specificity has been increasing (e.g., Goldstein & Weber, 1997; Shoda, 
Mischel, & Wright, 1994; Weber, et al., 2002), empirical domain-specific studies are still 
rare. In order to obtain a more complete understanding of personality, domain-specificity 
must be accounted for instead of ignored.  
Funder (2009) has pointed out that a focus on within-person variance across 
domains begs two questions: “Where do these patterns come from? How are they 
important?” (p. 122). Likewise, Mischel and colleagues have asserted, “By addressing 
not only the average level of behavior (e.g., overall agreeableness) but also when, where, 
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and with whom it occurs, one can see the individual’s distinctive coherent, and 
systematic patterns of behavior variation and glimpse the psychological processes and 
person variables that underlie them” (Shoda, et al., 1994, p. 686). We agree. Whereas the 
standard practice of averaging across domains can obscure important individual 
differences (Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002), examining domains as variables 
of interest can provide a more nuanced and accurate view of personality. As Shoda et al. 
(1994), Weber et al. (2002), and the current investigation have demonstrated, 
psychologically salient aspects of the domain (temptation, in this investigation) can to a 
large extent explain variance in domain-specific behavior. Further, we suggest that 
examining both within- and between-individual variance simultaneously can lead to 
important insights. For example, the cross-level interactions in this investigation revealed 
that more self-controlled individuals are better at overcoming temptations they found 
alluring yet harmful.  
Conclusion 
This investigation provides an explanation for the variation in impulsive behavior 
within individuals across domains: domain-specific impulsive behavior is a result of 
domain-specific temptation and, to a lesser extent, perceived harm. 
So, why was Tiger Woods impulsive when it came to sex but self-controlled in 
other domains? One possibility is that Woods did not think he would be caught (Magary, 
2010), and thus did not perceive the harm of his illicit trysts to be very high. The present 
investigation argues against this possibility. Instead, we suggest that Woods was more 
tempted to engage in impulsive sexual behavior than to procrastinate, lose his temper, or 
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take drugs. As Oscar Wilde’s quote suggests, Woods could resist everything but 
temptation. 
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Appendix 
 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale Instructions 
 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale Instructions in Study 1a 
 
Please answer the following items as they apply to you.  On a scale from 1 to 5—ranging 
from 1 being “Very unlikely” to 5 being “Very likely”—please indicate the likelihood of 
engaging in the following: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1                              2                              3                              4                         5 
Very unlikely            Unlikely   Somewhat likely       Likely     Very Likely 
 
 
 
Revised Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale Instructions in Studies 1b and 2 
 
On the following scale, please rate how often you do the following activities: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1                              2                              3                              4                         5 
    Never             Rarely                  Sometimes                  Often     Very Often 
 
 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale Instructions for Temptation and Perceived Harm 
Scales in Study 2 
 
How much would you enjoy the following activities if there were no long-term 
consequences for yourself or anyone else? That is, how attracted are you to these 
activities regardless of how harmful you might think they are. On the following scale, 
please rate how tempted you would be to do the following activities: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1                              2                              3                              4                         5 
Not tempted at all      │            Moderately tempted          │              Very tempted 
   Somewhat tempted                  Tempted 
 
 
How important is it to you to avoid the following behaviors? That is, how harmful to 
yourself or others do you think the following behaviors are? On the following scale, 
please rate how bad you think the following activities are: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1                              2                              3                              4                         5 
Not bad at all      │     Moderately bad          │       Very bad  
       Somewhat bad                     Bad 
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Table 1 
Factor Loadings, Subscale Corrected Item-Total Correlations, and Subscale Alphas for Six-Factor Solution with Orthogonal 
Varimax Rotation for the Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale in Study 1a 
    Factor loading Item-
total r 
Subscale 
α   Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Work 
       
.91 
 
Procrastinating .80 .05 .00 .14 .06 .07 .69 
 
 
Doing my work at the last minute .76 .02 .05 .09 -.01 .08 .63 
 
 
Wasting time in general .76 .13 -.01 .18 .22 .05 .76 
 
 
Letting responsibilities pile up .73 .19 .14 .06 .09 .11 .70 
 
 
Sitting around when I have work to do .72 .12 .05 .14 .33 .09 .77 
 
 
Being lazy when I have something to do .69 .12 .06 .16 .33 .04 .75 
 
 
Being inactive when I have work to do .65 .12 .04 .11 .49 .02 .74 
 
 
Giving in to distractions .64 .16 -.01 .17 .12 .10 .66 
 
 
Giving up when I get bored .39 .35 -.01 .05 .25 .07 .55 
 
 
Giving up when I get tired .32 .34 -.01 .15 .26 .11 .51 
 
 
Giving up when I am frustrated .31 .43 -.04 .14 .26 .07 .53 
 
 
Giving up when I encounter problems .18 .47 .00 .13 .33 .19 .45 
 
 
 
 
 
4
9
 
Relationship 
       
.85 
 
Getting angry easily .05 .67 .05 -.08 .05 .03 .59 
 
 
Losing my temper .08 .62 .05 -.05 .01 -.08 .53 
 
 
Being overly emotional .00 .61 -.06 .10 .04 .25 .57 
 
 
Behaving inappropriately when I am emotional .15 .58 -.02 .06 .01 .13 .54 
 
 
Saying things I later regret .14 .57 .04 .15 -.05 .12 .56 
 
 
Speaking before thinking .18 .57 .08 .16 -.01 .11 .56 
 
 
Telling secrets -.08 .55 .15 .10 .07 .00 .52 
 
 
Interrupting people .00 .50 .14 .16 .02 .15 .51 
 
 
Breaking promises .05 .49 .15 .03 .16 .02 .46 
 
 
Lying .14 .49 .20 .06 .05 .01 .49 
 
 
Being greedy .01 .48 .14 .06 .09 .16 .49 
 
 
Envying Others .12 .47 .10 .11 .02 .25 .50 
 Drug 
       
.88 
 
Drinking alcohol in general .22 .04 .82 .09 -.16 .07 .75 
 
 
Drinking beer .16 .02 .81 -.02 -.10 -.09 .75 
 
 
Drinking hard liquor .09 .14 .79 .03 -.10 .10 .73 
 
 
Binge drinking .09 .12 .74 -.07 -.07 .04 .71 
 
 
Smoking in general -.10 .15 .64 -.08 .28 .11 .60 
 
 
Drinking wine .06 .05 .60 .03 -.18 .19 .56 
 
 
Doing marijuana .05 .18 .59 -.10 .23 -.06 .57 
 
 
Smoking cigarettes -.18 .14 .54 -.09 .27 .10 .51 
 
 
Smoking cigars -.17 .08 .43 -.09 .07 -.10 .38 
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Food 
       
.85 
 
Eating junk food .23 .10 .03 .74 .18 -.03 .71 
 
 
Eating snacks .27 .08 -.06 .67 .08 .05 .67 
 
 
Eating dessert .00 .10 -.15 .67 .01 .13 .61 
 
 
Eating candy .09 .07 -.08 .66 .09 .13 .62 
 
 
Eating chips and other salty snacks .19 .16 .03 .64 .20 .00 .62 
 
 
Eating chocolate -.01 .02 -.09 .59 .03 .15 .51 
 
 
Eating fried food .11 .18 .12 .55 .23 -.17 .48 
 
 
Eating more than I should .31 .12 .03 .41 .01 .25 .48 
 
 
Eating when I am not hungry .26 .26 -.03 .38 -.02 .33 .46 
 Exercise 
       
.95 
 
Being inactive instead of working out .28 .12 .02 .20 .80 .16 .90 
 
 
Being inactive instead of doing aerobic exercise .32 .10 -.03 .21 .77 .16 .88 
 
 
Being sedentary instead of exercising .32 .11 -.01 .18 .76 .13 .87 
 
 
Staying home instead of going to the gym .29 .09 .01 .17 .75 .14 .85 
 Finance 
       
.91 
 
Buying things when I don't really need them .09 .14 .04 .09 .19 .81 .81 
 
 
Buying too many things .15 .22 .07 .14 .12 .79 .82 
 
 
Buying things on impulse .12 .29 .06 .06 .13 .73 .77 
   Spending too much money .11 .29 .11 .14 .13 .70 .76   
Note.  Factor loadings .40 and greater are shown in bold.
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Table 2 
DSIS Subscale and Self-Control Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations in Study 1a 
      Correlations 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Work 3.18 0.73 -             
2. Relationship 2.47 0.60 .39*** -      
3. Drug 2.32 0.87 .13* .25*** -     
4. Food 3.19 0.75 .46*** .31*** -.01 -    
5. Exercise 3.11 1.11 .58*** .26*** .04 .39*** -   
6. Finance 2.77 0.99 .36*** .42*** .16** .32*** .35*** -  
7. Self-Control Scale 3.01 0.62 -.64*** -.42*** -.34*** -.26*** -.40*** -.31*** - 
8. GPA
a
 3.32 0.35 -.17* -.09 .07 -.12 -.03 -.06 .28*** 
9. Social Relations 4.04 0.70 -.08 -.17** .05 .02 -.06 .00 .12* 
10. Health 3.59 0.87 -.35*** -.26*** -.06 -.26*** -.52*** -.19** .40*** 
11. Urgency 2.71 0.71 .31*** .63*** .27*** .13* .22*** .33*** -.55*** 
12. (Lack of) Premeditation 3.42 0.73 .08 .17** .29*** -.01 -.06 .16** -.41*** 
13. (Lack of) Perseverance 3.44 0.64 .46*** .14* .07 .15* .22*** .17** -.57*** 
14. Sensation Seeking 3.19 0.83 .03 -.02 .28*** -.07 -.19** -.08 -.19** 
Note.  DSIS = Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale. Correlations shown in bold were predicted to be significant. 
a
The number of cases for GPA was reduced to 188 because the freshmen in this study did not yet have a college GPA. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 3 
Factor Loadings, Subscale Corrected Item-Total Correlations, and Subscale Alphas for Confirmatory Six-Factor Model of the 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale in Study 1b 
    Factor loading Item-
total r 
Subscale 
α   Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Work 
       
.92 
 
Putting off work that needs to get done .84 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .79 
 
 
Procrastinating .80 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .74 
 
 
Letting responsibilities pile up .77 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .72 
 
 
Doing nothing when I have work to do .77 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .73 
 
 
Wasting time .77 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .73 
 
 
Delaying the start of big projects .76 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .72 
 
 
Doing my work at the last minute .76 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .71 
 
 
Getting distracted from my work .72 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .69 
 
 
Quitting when I am frustrated .57 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .60 
 
 
Giving up when I encounter problems .55 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .57 
 
 
Quitting when I get bored .52 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .54 
 
 
Stopping my work when I get tired .46 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .46 
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Food 
       
.86 
 
Snacking on junk food .00 .84 .00 .00 .00 .00 .76 
 
 
Eating snacks .00 .74 .00 .00 .00 .00 .68 
 
 
Consuming more food than I should .00 .70 .00 .00 .00 .00 .62 
 
 
Eating when I am not hungry .00 .69 .00 .00 .00 .00 .61 
 
 
Eating chips and other salty snacks .00 .66 .00 .00 .00 .00 .58 
 
 
Eating candy .00 .63 .00 .00 .00 .00 .61 
 
 
Eating chocolate .00 .49 .00 .00 .00 .00 .48 
 
 
Having dessert .00 .49 .00 .00 .00 .00 .49 
 
 
Eating fried food .00 .49 .00 .00 .00 .00 .42 
 Finance 
       
.91 
 
Purchasing things when I don't really need .00 .00 .85 .00 .00 .00 .78 
 
 
Buying a lot of things .00 .00 .84 .00 .00 .00 .79 
 
 
Buying things I hadn’t planned to buy .00 .00 .83 .00 .00 .00 .77 
 
 
Buying things on impulse .00 .00 .81 .00 .00 .00 .77 
 
 
Spending a lot of money .00 .00 .77 .00 .00 .00 .74 
 
 
Spending rather than saving my money .00 .00 .67 .00 .00 .00 .65 
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Relationship 
       
.80 
 
Complaining about my problems .00 .00 .00 .59 .00 .00 .52 
 
 
Gossiping .00 .00 .00 .57 .00 .00 .49 
 
 
Telling another person’s secret .00 .00 .00 .55 .00 .00 .49 
 
 
Losing my temper .00 .00 .00 .54 .00 .00 .50 
 
 
Getting angry .00 .00 .00 .54 .00 .00 .49 
 
 
Taking more than my fair share
a
 .00 .00 .00 .52 .00 .00 .44 
 
 
Holding a grudge .00 .00 .00 .51 .00 .00 .44 
 
 
Breaking promises .00 .00 .00 .48 .00 .00 .40 
 
 
Speaking before thinking .00 .00 .00 .46 .00 .00 .42 
 
 
Lying .00 .00 .00 .45 .00 .00 .39 
 
 
Interrupting people when they are talking .00 .00 .00 .45 .00 .00 .40 
 Drug 
       
.78 
 
Getting drunk .00 .00 .00 .00 .90 .00 .74 
 
 
Binge drinking .00 .00 .00 .00 .78 .00 .65 
 
 
Drinking hard liquor .00 .00 .00 .00 .68 .00 .58 
 
 
Drinking beer .00 .00 .00 .00 .62 .00 .56 
 
 
Drinking wine .00 .00 .00 .00 .51 .00 .39 
 
 
Getting high on drugs .00 .00 .00 .00 .37 .00 .43 
 
 
Smoking marijuana .00 .00 .00 .00 .35 .00 .40 
 
 
Smoking cigarettes .00 .00 .00 .00 .32 .00 .31 
 
 
Smoking cigars .00 .00 .00 .00 .25 .00 .26 
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Exercise 
       
.90 
 
Avoiding physical exercise .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .92 .84 
 
 
Remaining physically inactive .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .87 .82 
 
 
Avoiding working out
b
 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .83 .76 
   Being sedentary .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .70 .66   
Note.  Factor loadings .40 and greater are shown in bold. All factor loadings were significant at p < .001. 
a
The full item was "Taking more than my fair share (i.e., being greedy)." 
b
The full item was "Avoiding working out (e.g., jogging, 
going to the gym, etc.)." 
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Table 4 
DSIS Subscale and Self-Control Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations in Study 1b 
      Correlations 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Work 2.97 0.71 -       
2. Relationship 2.43 0.49 .47*** -      
3. Drug 1.65 0.56 .12*** .08** -     
4. Food 2.98 0.71 .31*** .35*** -.06* -    
5. Exercise 3.07 1.00 .47*** .29*** .02 .41*** -   
6. Finance 2.64 0.79 .40*** .42*** .12*** .31*** .24*** -  
7. Self-Control Scale 3.27 0.65 -.69*** -.51*** -.26*** -.38*** -.46*** -.44*** - 
8. BMI
a
 25.83 6.13 .11*** .09** -.10*** .38*** .38*** .15*** -.23*** 
Note.  DSIS = Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale. Correlations shown in bold were predicted to be significant. 
a
BMI = Body Mass Index. These analyses are based on the 1,436 cases that reported height and weight information. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 5 
Mean, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for the DSIS-B and Self-Control Scale, DSIS-T, and DSIS-H in Study 2 
Measure     Correlations 
DSIS-B Subscale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Work 3.04 0.66 - 
     
 
2. Relationship 2.50 0.46 .44*** - 
    
 
3. Drug 1.92 0.67 .09 .17** - 
   
 
4. Food 3.06 0.61 .41*** .37*** -.04 - 
  
 
5. Exercise 2.77 0.90 .48*** .30*** -.03 .32*** - 
 
 
6. Finance 2.63 0.73 .32*** .32*** .24*** .28*** .13* - 
Self-Control Scale 3.21 0.59 -.69*** -.52*** -.34*** -.32*** -.40*** -.37*** 
DSIS-T Subscale     1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Work 3.05 0.93 - 
     
 
2. Relationship 2.25 0.75 .56*** - 
    
 
3. Drug 2.16 0.97 .31*** .35*** - 
   
 
4. Food 3.28 0.92 .50*** .42*** .30*** - 
  
 
5. Exercise 2.59 1.14 .60*** .42*** .14* .44*** - 
 
 
6. Finance 3.19 1.14 .54*** .43*** .43*** .50*** .28*** - 
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DSIS-H Subscale     1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Work 3.33 0.72 - 
     
 
2. Relationship 3.39 0.64 .60*** - 
    
 
3. Drug 3.25 0.91 .41*** .32*** - 
   
 
4. Food 2.53 0.85 .43*** .45*** .33*** - 
  
 
5. Exercise 3.41 0.85 .60*** .49*** .28*** .54*** - 
   6. Finance 3.04 0.75 .60*** .53*** .37*** .55*** .48*** - 
Note.  DSIS = Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale.  -B = Behavior.  -T = Temptation.  -H = Perceived harm 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.
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Table 6 
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Domain-Specific Impulsive Behavior in Study 2 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed components 
     
  
Intercept 2.65 (0.02) 2.65 (0.02) 2.65 (0.02) 2.65 (0.02) 2.65 (0.02) 
  
Temptationª 
 
0.58 (0.02) 
 
0.53 (0.02) 0.53 (0.02) 
  
Perceived harmª 
  
-.35 (0.03) -0.10 (0.02) -0.11 (0.02) 
  
Self-control
b
 
    
-0.49 (0.02) 
  
Self-control x Temptation
b
 
    
-0.08 (0.03) 
  
Self-control x Perceived harm
b
 
    
-0.19 (0.03) 
Random components           
 
Between-individual variance 
     
  
Intercept, ζ0 .08 .13 .10 .13 .05 
  
Temptation slope, ζ1 
 
.04 
 
.05 .05 
  
Perceived-harm slope, ζ2 
  
.10 .03 .02 
  Within-individual variance, ε .54 .23 .04 .22 .22 
Note. All of the fixed components and between-individual variance components were significant at p < .001, except for the Self-
control x Temptation fixed component in Model 5 (p < .05) and the variance component of the perceived-harm slope in Models 4 
(p < .05) and 5 (ns). 
ªVariable was individual-mean centered. 
b
Self-control was between-individual grand-mean centered.
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Table 7 
Group Means on the DSIS-T Subscales in Study 3 
  Subscale (Domain)   
Group Work Food Finance Drug Exercise n 
 DSIS-T  
Work 3.60
a
 3.42 3.28 2.23 2.87 152 
Food 3.06 3.64
a
 3.41 2.17 2.95 61 
Finance 2.96 3.45 3.66
a
 2.25 2.54 102 
Drug 2.92 3.19 3.33 2.88
a
 2.41 78 
Exercise 3.26 3.54 3.72 1.97 3.61
a
 26 
All 3.22 3.42 3.43 2.33 2.76 419 
Note. DSIS-T = Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale - 
Temptation. 
a
Mean is significantly higher (p < .05) than the mean of the rest 
of the sample in this domain. 
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Table 8 
Group Differences in DSIS-T Subscales in Study 3 
    Target Group All Other Groups   
Measure M SD M SD d 
DSIS-T Subscale      
 Work 3.60 0.79 3.00 0.87 .72*** 
 Food 3.64 0.89 3.39 0.91 .28* 
 Finance 3.66 1.06 3.35 1.14 .27* 
 Drug 2.88 0.79 2.20 0.95 .74*** 
  Exercise 3.61 1.01 2.71 1.05 .86*** 
Note.  DSIS-T = Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale - 
Temptation. 
* p < .05.  *** p < .001.  
 
 
62 
 
Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Illustration of model that explains between-individual (1a) and within-
individual (1b) variance in impulsive behavior. OIB = Overall Impulsive Behavior. 
DGSC = Domain-General Self-Control. DSIB = Domain-Specific Impulsive Behavior. 
DST = Domain-Specific Temptation. 
Figure 2. Mean Temptation by domain and subgroups. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of model that explains between-individual (1a) and within-
individual (1b) variance in impulsive behavior. 
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Figure 2. Mean Temptation by domain and subgroups. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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Chapter 2: Domain-Specific Temporal Discounting and Temptation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter originally appeared as Tsukayama, E., & Duckworth, A. L. (2010) Domain-
specific temporal discounting and temptation. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 72-82. 
According to the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, copyright permissions for 
articles in Judgment and Decision Making remain with the author.
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Abstract 
In this investigation, we test whether temporal discounting is domain-specific (i.e., 
compared to other people, can an individual have a relatively high discount rate for one 
type of reward but a relatively low discount rate for another?) and examine whether 
individual differences in the types of rewards one finds tempting explain domain-
specificity in discount rates. Adults discounted delayed rewards they found particularly 
tempting (defined as the visceral attraction to and enjoyment of a reward) more steeply 
than did adults who did not find the rewards as tempting, contrary to what might be 
expected from the magnitude effect. Furthermore, we found significant group by domain 
interactions (e.g., chip lovers who do not like beer have relatively high discount rates for 
chips and relatively low discount rates for beer, whereas beer lovers who do not like 
chips showed the opposite pattern). These results suggest that domain-specificity in 
temptation partially accounts for corresponding domain-specificity in temporal 
discounting. 
 
 
Key words: temporal discounting, time preference, intertemporal choice, domain-
specific, temptation 
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Domain-specific temporal discounting and temptation 
 
1 Introduction 
Temporal discounting refers to the tendency to discount the subjective value of 
future goods as a function of the delay to receiving them. Generally, people prefer not to 
wait for rewards; however, the degree to which delayed rewards are discounted varies 
across individuals. Most research on temporal discounting has examined temporal 
discounting of monetary rewards (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). In this 
study, we test whether temporal discounting is domain-specific (i.e., compared to other 
people, can an individual have a relatively high discount rate for one type of reward but a 
relatively low discount rate for another?). Moreover, we examine whether individual 
differences in the types of rewards one finds tempting explain domain-specificity in 
discount rates. 
According to the normative model of intertemporal choice, utility from different 
types of rewards should be discounted at the same rate. Otherwise, discounting 
exchangeable goods at different rates would lead to preference reversals. Chapman 
(1996) showed that discount rates were domain-specific and tested a utility function 
explanation for domain-specificity. According to the utility function explanation, 
domain-specific discount rates may be due to individual differences in the relative 
valuation of goods in different domains combined with the magnitude effect, where 
smaller outcomes are discounted more steeply than larger outcomes (Thaler, 1981). For 
instance, a person may discount money more steeply than she discounts health because 
she values health (the larger outcome) more than she values money (the smaller 
outcome). Chapman ruled out the utility function explanation by showing that domain-
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specificity persisted even after matching outcomes in utility. She concluded that 
“important topics for future research are other possible causes of this effect” (p. 787). 
We propose that individuals have steeper discount rates for rewards that they 
desire and enjoy more. Specifically, we hypothesize that temptation—defined as the 
visceral attraction to and enjoyment of a reward, regardless of the associated harm—
increases the tendency to choose smaller-sooner rewards over larger-later rewards.
14
 For 
instance, if someone derives tremendous gratification from eating chocolate, then she 
would require a larger amount of delayed chocolate to match the subjective value of the 
immediate amount. This prediction is consistent with dual-process models that posit a 
“hot” emotional system that is mainly influenced by immediate considerations, and a 
“cool” deliberative system that is influenced by both immediate and long-term 
considerations (e.g., Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). The 
beta-delta preference model formally represents these processes through a quasi-
hyperbolic discount function composed of a beta parameter that makes a sharp distinction 
between the present and future and a delta parameter that discounts at a constant rate 
across time (Laibson, 1997; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Steep 
discount rates, in this view, arise from relatively high activation of the hot system 
represented by the beta parameter. To continue our example, the prospect of an 
immediately consumable chocolate donut would disproportionately activate the chocolate 
lover’s hot system, which would increase the value of the immediate option and lead to 
steeper discounting. 
                                                            
14 How does temptation differ from utility? Utility is a summary measure which reflects the achievement of 
all the goals an individual holds. Temptation affects utility, but so do judgments of associated harm and 
other factors (e.g., when assessing the utility of drinking wine, one might consider the beneficial 
antioxidant effects). 
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In support of our hypothesis, addicts and substance users have steeper discount 
rates for their favored addictions than for money (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; 
Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; 
Petry, 2001).
15
 Specifically, these studies have found evidence for domain effects (e.g., 
discount rates in the alcohol domain are higher than in the money domain) and group 
effects (e.g., alcoholics have higher discount rates than non-alcoholics), but they do not 
report effects for an interaction.
16
 These domain and group effects are consistent with but 
do not provide sufficiently convincing evidence for our hypothesis. It is possible, for 
example, that alcohol is discounted more steeply than money by both alcoholics and non-
alcoholics (i.e., a domain effect), and alcoholics may just have steeper discount rates in 
general than non-alcoholics (i.e., a group effect). 
A group by domain interaction would present strong support for our hypothesis 
that temptation increases discounting. Specifically, we predict that individuals who are 
tempted within one domain (e.g., alcohol) will have relatively high discount rates in that 
domain (relative to both themselves across domains and with other groups within that 
domain) after accounting for domain and group differences. In the current study, we 
predict that a) discount rate correlations will be stronger within a domain than between 
domains, b) individuals who are tempted by a reward will have steeper discount rates for 
                                                            
15 Except for Petry’s (2001) study, the discounted substance was equal in value with the monetary reward in 
each study. In Petry’s study, the discounted substance (alcohol) was roughly equal in value to the monetary 
rewards used (15 bottles of alcohol vs. $100 and 150 bottles of alcohol vs. $1000). 
16 What we refer to as domain effect is distinct from domain-specificity. By domain-specificity we refer to 
the idea that “compared to other people, an individual can have a relatively high discount rate for one 
type of reward but a relatively low discount rate for another”. In contrast, we use the term domain effect 
to refer to the idea that the mean discount rate in one domain is higher than in another. Although we 
report domain effects in one section of the results (titled “Domain effects”), the focus in this paper is on 
domain-specificity. 
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that reward compared to individuals who are less or not tempted by the reward, and c) 
individuals will have steeper discount rates for rewards that they find tempting compared 
to rewards that they do not find as tempting. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Five hundred nineteen undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at a 
large, private university in the Northeast participated in this study for research experience 
credit (M = 20.9 years, SD = 1.9; 66% were women). We removed forty-eight outliers 
who took longer than 12 minutes (i.e., z > 2.58) to finish the temporal discounting tasks,
17
 
resulting in a final sample of N = 471. Approximately 58% of the participants were 
Caucasian, 26% were Asian, 7% were Latino, 5% were Black, and 4% were of other 
ethnic backgrounds. 
2.2 Procedure 
From March 2008 to May 2009, we posted this study online and advertised it as a 
survey of personality and behavior on the psychology department’s subject pool website. 
Participants first filled out an online questionnaire asking how tempting they found 
certain behaviors.
18
 They were then directed to another website to complete the temporal 
                                                            
17 The distribution of time spent on the temporal discounting task was extremely right-skewed: absolute 
skew index of 16.71; 3.0 is considered extreme (Kline, 2005). As a result, there were only positive outliers 
and the number of outliers was higher than would be expected from a normal distribution. According to the 
website timestamps, several of the participants took over an hour to complete the task. Although this may 
suggest that they were painstakingly thoughtful in responding, we think that it is more like that they were 
not being attentive and multitasking, or that some glitch occurred that disrupted the timestamp. Because 
either might be problematic, we decided to remove outliers. We chose 12 minutes because it corresponded 
to a z-value of 2.58, which in turn corresponds to a two-tailed p-value of .01. Absolute differences between 
the discount rate correlations from the full sample and the sample with outliers removed ranged from .01 to 
.03, average = .02; mean differences ranged from .00 to .01, average = .00; and there were no differences 
(i.e., above .005) in standard deviations. 
18 Participants also filled out questionnaires asking how often they engaged in and how harmful they 
deemed those behaviors. Those questionnaires were used for another study and are not discussed further. 
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discounting measures. Finally, participants completed a demographics questionnaire and 
were forwarded to a debriefing page. 
2.3 Material 
2.3.1 Temptation 
 Participants were asked to “rate how tempted you would be to do the following” 
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = Not tempted at all to 5 = Very tempting. To clarify 
our definition of temptation, we presented the following description: “How much would 
you enjoy the following activities if there were no long-term consequences for yourself or 
anyone else? That is, how attracted are you to these activities regardless of how harmful 
you might think they are.” The three focal items—Eating candy, Eating chips and other 
salty snacks, and Drinking beer—were presented in a set of 51 items (see Appendix A for 
the questionnaire instructions and items). 
2.3.2 Temporal discount rates 
The instructions for the temporal discounting task were as follows: 
The purpose of this study is to examine preferences about rewards of 
money, chips, candy, and beer. You will be asked to choose between an 
amount that can be received immediately and another amount that can be 
received after a delay. You will not actually receive the rewards. However, 
please make each choice as if it were real. 
When making your choices, please assume the following: There are no 
risks associated with the delayed option. In other words, you are 
guaranteed to receive it after the specified delay. Also, choosing the 
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delayed option does not mean that you will receive old goods. Delayed 
goods are brand new, but you will not receive them until after the delay. 
Each participant made choices about four types of rewards—dollars, candy bars, 
bags of chips, and bottles of beer—at five delays: one week, one month, six months, one 
year, and three years. For each reward, participants made four choices at each delay for a 
total of eighty choices (four rewards x five delays x four choices). We randomized the 
order of rewards for each participant. Likewise, within each type of reward, we 
randomized the order of delays. 
Within each reward by delay set (e.g., dollars in one month), a staircase method 
was used to converge on participants’ indifference points (the amount of immediate 
reward equal in subjective value to the delayed reward). The first choice was between an 
immediate reward of eight units (i.e., dollars, candy bars, bags of chips, or bottles of 
beer) and a delayed reward of sixteen units. In the three subsequent choices, the delayed 
reward was held constant, but the immediate amount varied depending on the preceding 
choice. If the participant selected the immediate reward, the next immediate reward was 
decreased. However, if the participant selected the delayed reward, the next immediate 
reward was increased. The size of the adjustment (the increase or decrease in the 
immediate reward) decreased by fifty percent after every choice: the first adjustment was 
four units, the second was two, and the last was one. For example, if a participant chose 
sixteen dollars in a month over eight dollars immediately, the next choice would be 
between twelve dollars immediately and sixteen dollars in one month. If the participant 
then chose twelve dollars immediately, the next choice would be between ten dollars 
immediately and sixteen dollars in one month. See Appendix B for a flowchart of 
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possible choices. After the discounting task, participants were presented with the 
following question for each type of reward: 
Was it difficult to make decisions about [reward]? 
 Not at all 
 Somewhat, but I eventually came to a decision that felt right 
 Very much so, because I do not like [reward] and I did not have strong 
preferences between immediate and delayed options 
 Other, please specify:  
 
2.4 Data analyses 
2.4.1 Discount rate computation 
An indifference point is the amount of immediate reward that is equal in 
subjective value to the delayed reward. We computed indifference points as the average 
of the last immediate reward that was selected and the last immediate reward that was 
rejected. In the two (out of sixteen) possible circumstances that preferences did not 
change—always selecting the immediate reward or always selecting the delayed 
reward—we computed the indifference point as the average of the last immediate amount 
(either $1 or $15) and the limit ($0 or $16). That is, if the participant always selected the 
immediate reward, we computed the indifference point as $0.50, and if the participant 
always selected the delayed reward, we computed the indifference point as $15.50. Thus, 
there were 16 evenly spaced indifference points ranging from $0.50 to $15.50.  
With the indifference points, we computed the area under the curve (AUTC: 
Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001) measure of temporal discounting for each 
reward type for each participant (i.e., four AUTCs per participant). This measure of 
discounting does not require the data to conform to a particular model or theory and is 
generally less skewed than other measures of discounting (Myerson et al., 2001). To 
compute the AUTCs, we first set the maximum reward (16 units) and the maximum delay 
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(3 years) to equal one. Then, we converted the indifference points to proportions of the 
maximum reward, and the delays to proportions of the maximum delay. For example, if 
an indifference point was 14.5 units, we would divide 14.5 by 16 for a new value of 
.90625. With these new values, we computed the area of trapezoids using the following 
formula: (x2 – x1) [ (y1+y2) / 2 ], where “x2” and “x1” are consecutive delays (with the 
“immediate delay” being equal to “0”) and “y1” and “y2” are the indifference points 
associated with those delays (or “1” for the “immediate delay”). The AUTC is then 
computed by summing the area of the trapezoids (see Figure 1). Theoretically, AUTCs 
calculated in this manner can range from 0 to 1.0. However, because the indifference 
points in this study ranged from 0.5 units to 15.5 units (and not 0 to 16), the effective 
range of AUTCs was 0.034 to 0.969. So that higher values would indicate steeper 
discount rates, we reverse-scored the AUTCs (1-AUTC) to use as our measure of 
temporal discount rates. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the Area Under the Curve. The maximum reward and the 
maximum delay were set to one. We then converted the indifference points to proportions 
of the maximum reward, and the delays to proportions of the maximum delay. 
 
We calculated discount rates for all participants who completed all relevant trials 
and who answered either “not at all” or “somewhat, but I eventually came to a decision 
that felt right” to the difficulty of responding question.19 Out of 471 participants, 96% had 
discount rates for dollars, 86% had discount rates for candy, 77% had discount rates for 
chips, and 74% had discount rates for beer. 
The distributions of discount rates were slightly negatively skewed (absolute 
values ≥ -0.93) and platykurtic (absolute values ≥ -1.04). Natural log transformations 
                                                            
19 Our pilot study indicated that some participants chose to respond at random because they had a difficult 
time making a decision between immediate and delayed rewards that they did not like. Similarly, 
discounting could be flat because utility for an item is always zero. Because of these potential problems, we 
only retained discount rates for participants who responded “not at all” or “somewhat, but I eventually 
came to a decision that felt right” to the difficulty of responding question. If we included the data from 
participants who had a difficult time completing the task because they did not like the reward, the rho 
correlations between temptation ratings and the corresponding discount rates would have increased slightly 
on average: absolute differences ranged from .01 to .03, average = .02. Absolute differences between 
discount rate correlations ranged from .00 to .03, average = .02; differences in discount rate means ranged 
from .00 to .03, average = .01; and differences in standard deviations ranged from .00 to .02, average = .01. 
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(conducted before reverse-scoring the AUTCs) reduced the skew (absolute values ≥ -
0.75) but exacerbated kurtosis (absolute values ≥ -1.24). Consequently, we conducted 
Spearman’s Rho (ρ) correlations and ANOVAs on the untransformed data.20 
2.4.2 Candylover, chiplover, and beerlover groups 
 
In order to test our predicted group by domain interaction, we created comparison 
groups. We predicted that individuals who are tempted by reward x but not reward y 
would have relatively high discount rates for x and relatively low discount rates for y 
compared to individuals who are tempted by y but not x. For instance, individuals who 
like candy but not beer should have relatively high discount rates for candy and relatively 
low discount rates for beer. We labeled these individuals “candylovers” (n = 93) and 
operationally defined them as individuals who rated the temptation to eat candy as three 
or more and the temptation to drink beer as two or less on the five-point scales. We did 
the same for “chiplovers” (except for the chip item instead of candy; n = 84) and the 
opposite for “beerlovers” (i.e., individuals who rated the temptation to drink beer as three 
or more and the temptation to eat candy, or chips depending on the comparison, as two or 
less; n = 34 in both comparisons). 
3 Results 
3.1 Discount rate correlations 
As predicted, discount rates for the two food items (candy and chips) were more 
strongly associated than any other pair of discount rates, and the discount rates for 
                                                            
20 ANOVAs and t-tests based on large samples (about n > 30 within each group) are robust to violations of 
the assumption of normality because sampling distributions of means approach normality as sample size 
increases (Myers & Well, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Although regression coefficients in general 
are asymptotically normally-distributed (Berry, 1993), to our knowledge there are no clear guidelines about 
what constitutes a large-enough sample for the coefficients of continuous predictors to be approximately 
normal. Consequently, we erred on the side of caution and used non-parametric rho correlations instead of 
Pearson product-moment correlations. Absolute differences between the rho and Pearson discount rate 
correlations ranged from .00 to .04, average = .02. 
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consumables (candy, chips, and beer) were more strongly associated with each other than 
with the discount rates for money. Pairwise and listwise analyses yielded similar results 
(correlation differences ranged from .01 to .06, average difference = .03), so listwise 
analyses (n = 260) are presented in Table 1. All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
The correlation between candy and chips (ρ = .60) was significantly larger than any other 
(ps < .05). In turn, the correlation between candy and beer (ρ = .49) was higher than the 
correlations between candy and money (ρ = .34; z = 2.31, p = .02) and beer and money (ρ 
= .29, z = 3.14, p = .002); and the correlation between chips and beer (ρ = .47) was higher 
than the correlations between chips and money (ρ = .30, z = 2.56, p = .01) and beer and 
money (ρ = .29, z = 2.73, p = .006). 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, and Spearman rho correlations for candy, chips, beer, and 
money discount rates using listwise deletion 
      ρ 
Discount rate M SD Candy Chips Beer 
1. Candy .68 .30 - 
  2. Chips .67 .32 .60 - 
 3. Beer .65 .32 .49 .47 - 
4. Money .57 .29 .34 .30 .29 
Note.  n = 260. All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
 
 
3.2 Domain effects 
Discount rates for money were significantly lower than discount rates for alcohol 
and food. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for domain, 
F(2.77, 717.33) = 11.13, p < .001 (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Bonferroni-corrected t-tests 
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indicated that money was discounted less steeply than the other rewards (ps < .05) but the 
discount rates for the other rewards did not differ from each other (ps > .29).  
 
Figure 2. Temporal discounting functions for money, candy, chips, and beer using mean 
indifference points. Subjective value was computed as the proportion of the amount of 
the delayed reward. Standard errors ranged from .01 to .02. Error bars are not presented 
because they were barely visible. 
 
3.3 Associations between discount rates and temptation 
As expected, individuals who were more tempted by a reward tended to have 
steeper discount rates for that reward, ρ = .14, p = .008 for chips and ρ = .19, p < .001 for 
beer. Although the rho correlation for candy was not significant (ρ = .03, ns), trend 
analyses revealed significant linear effects of temptation on discount rates for candy (F(1, 
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399) = 6.08, p = .01), as well as chips (F(1, 357) = 16.00, p < .001), and beer, F(1, 343) = 
16.78, p < .001.
21
 Figure 3 shows these upward trends. 
 
Figure 3. Mean discount rate as a function of ratings on the corresponding temptation 
item. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
3.4 Candylover-beerlover and chiplover-beerlover interactions 
As predicted, individuals had steeper discount rates for rewards they found 
tempting than for rewards they did not. Two-way mixed-design ANOVAs with groups 
(either candylovers vs. beerlovers or chiplovers vs. beerlovers) as the between-individual 
factor and reward type (either candy and beer or chips and beer) as the within-individual 
factor revealed significant interaction terms: F(1, 125) = 4.83, p = .03, partial η² = .04, for 
                                                            
21 Trend analysis is a planned comparison following an ANOVA that examines linear and higher-order 
polynomial trends of the dependent variable means as a function of an ordered categorical independent 
variable (Field, 2005; Keppel, 1991; Myers & Well, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
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the candylover-beerlover comparison (see Figure 4) and F(1, 116) = 8.33, p = .005, 
partial η² = .07, for the chiplover-beerlover comparison (see Figure 5). Except for the 
group effect in the candylover-beerlover comparison, F(1, 125) = 6.55, p = .01, partial η² 
= .05, none of the main effects were significant. Planned comparisons revealed that the 
candylovers and chiplovers had steeper discount rates for candy (t(92) = 2.17, p = .03, d 
= .23) and chips (t(83) = 2.81, p = .006 , d = .31, respectively, compared to beer. 
Although similar analyses for beerlovers did not reveal significant differences for candy 
versus beer (t(33) = -1.57, p = .13 , d = -.27, and for chips versus beer (t(33) = -1.67, p = 
.10, d = -.29 the results were in the predicted direction, and the effect sizes were larger on 
average than in candylover and chiplover analyses, suggesting that these analyses did not 
reach significance because of the relatively small sample size for beerlovers.
22
 
                                                            
22 Using the observed effect sizes, power analyses revealed that beerlover sample sizes of n = 111 for the 
candy versus beer analysis and n = 98 for the chips versus beer analysis would be required for a power of 
.80 with a two-tailed alpha of .05. 
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Figure 4. Mean discount rate as a function of reward type (candy or beer) and group 
(candylovers or beerlovers). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 5. Mean discount rate as a function of reward type (chips or beer) and group 
(chiplovers or beerlovers). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
4 Discussion 
 The current investigation found empirical support for domain-specificity in 
temporal discounting. Discount rate correlations showed a hierarchical pattern: the 
correlation between food items was higher than the correlations between other items, and 
correlations between consumable (food and alcohol) items were larger than correlations 
between consumable items and money.  
Nevertheless, the discount rates were all positively correlated (ρs ≥ .29), 
suggesting that there is also a domain-general aspect of temporal discounting. Which 
processes affect temporal discounting across domains? Time perspective is one factor 
that influences decisions about the present and future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Present-
oriented people might have steeper discount rates in general than those with a 
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predominant future time perspective. It is also possible that people make domain-general 
decision rules (e.g., if the delay for any reward is less than a month, choose the larger 
reward; otherwise, choose the immediate reward), which could lead to similar 
discounting across domains. Another possibility is that working memory, “the ability to 
maintain active representations of goal-relevant information despite interference from 
competing or irrelevant information”, is necessary to process and integrate goals and 
values to make decisions (Shamosh et al., 2008, p. 904). Regardless of domain, 
individuals with low working memory capacity may be less proficient at evaluating 
delayed options, and thus may default to immediate options. 
Notwithstanding evidence of domain-general processes involved in discounting, 
individuals in our study tended to have higher discount rates for rewards that they found 
more tempting. This result is particularly noteworthy because it runs counter to a 
prediction based on the magnitude effect: the observation that discount rates are lower for 
more valuable rewards (Thaler, 1981). If temptation were a proxy of overall value, then 
there should be lower discount rates in tempting domains, not higher discount rates, as we 
predicted and found.
 
The beta-delta preference model of temporal discounting (Laibson, 
1997; McClure et al., 2004) provides a framework that reconciles these apparently 
paradoxical findings. Temptation directly affects the hot system (represented by the beta 
parameter), whereas temptation is only indirectly “valued” through the cool system’s 
evaluation of the impact of temptation on the emotional system (Loewenstein & 
O'Donoghue, 2007). Consequently, temptation is predicted to have a disproportionate 
effect on the immediate option through the beta parameter, which would lead to steeper 
discounting. A possible explanation for the magnitude effect is that large amounts might 
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seem hypothetical and are thus evaluated by deliberative cognitive systems as opposed to 
visceral emotional systems. According to the beta-delta model, these larger amounts 
would then be discounted less steeply than smaller amounts that evoke the emotional 
system.
23
 
Although we were not primarily interested in domain effects (i.e., the mean 
discount rate in one domain is higher than another), it is noteworthy that our study 
replicates the finding that consumable rewards are discounted more steeply than non-
consumable rewards (Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; 
Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; Odum & Rainaud, 2003). Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that the discount rates for rewards by which participants reported “not 
tempted at all” did not differ from the discount rate for money (all ts < 1.27; all ps > .21). 
One interpretation of these findings is that the people who were not tempted by a 
particular reward considered that reward to be essentially non-consumable.
24
 
4.1 Limitations and future directions 
This study had several limitations. First, we did not match rewards for utility.
25
 It 
is possible, therefore, that we would not have found domain-specificity had we controlled 
for utility. Against this possibility, Chapman (1996) matched rewards for subjective value 
and shape of utility functions and still found domain-specificity in discount rates. 
                                                            
23 Another possible explanation for the magnitude effect is that the ratio of two large amounts seems greater 
than the same ratio of small amounts (e.g., $100/$50 seems larger than $10/$5). Consequently, one may 
prefer $5 now over $10 in a year, but also prefer $100 in a year over $50 immediately because the ratio 
seems larger in the latter case. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) call this effect “increasing proportional 
sensitivity”. There is also some evidence to suggest that the magnitude effect is actually a number effect 
(Furlong & Opfer, 2009). That is, it may be the number associated with the reward and not the actual value 
of the reward that affects discounting (e.g., $1 is equivalent to 100 cents, but the latter may be discounted 
more steeply). However, the study by Furlong and Opfer (2009) examined the prisoner’s dilemma and not 
temporal discounting. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this lead on the magnitude as number effect. 
24 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
25 The rewards used in this study were roughly comparable in price. A large candy bar is about $1, a 
“personal-size” bag of chips is about a $1, and a bottle of beer is about $1-2. 
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Second, the small number of items used to represent domains limits our ability to 
generalize to other items and domains. Moreover, the focal items (candy, chips, and beer) 
in our study were all consumable and potentially perceived as harmful, whereas money 
and health are generally perceived as being unequivocally good. Future studies should 
include more items and domains to extend these findings. 
Third, we used hypothetical rather than real rewards. While at least one study 
suggests that real rewards are discounted more steeply than hypothetical rewards (Kirby, 
1997), several more recent studies suggest that hypothetical and real rewards are 
discounted similarly (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Lagorio & Madden, 2005; Madden, 
Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Madden et al., 2004). Nevertheless, future studies are 
needed to replicate the current investigation using real rewards. 
Fourth, the correlational design of the current investigation limits causal 
inference. Our conjecture that temptation drives discount rates seems more plausible than 
the possibility that discount rates drive temptation. However, unmeasured third-variable 
confounds cannot be ruled out. In an experimental study, temptation for specific rewards 
might be manipulated (e.g., increasing the temptation of food rewards by requiring 
participants to fast beforehand) and consequent effects on domain-specific discount rates 
observed. 
Finally, when asking our participants to rate temptation, we did not distinguish 
between wanting (the motivation for a reward) and liking (the hedonic experience of a 
reward), which are dissociable processes at the neuroanatomical level (Berridge & 
Kringelbach, 2008; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). Although wanting and liking 
generally tend to co-occur, it would be interesting to examine whether these two 
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processes have different effects on discount rates. A priori, we would predict that wanting 
would have a stronger effect on discounting as liking presumably exerts its effect on 
decision-making through wanting (e.g., I want an apple because I like apples). Indeed, the 
fact that drug addicts can want drugs that they do not like (Robinson & Berridge, 2000), 
suggests that wanting, and not liking, leads to drug abuse. Because wanting and liking are 
difficult, if not impossible, to dissociate at the conscious level, it is not clear to us how to 
test this hypothesis experimentally. Nevertheless, we see this as an important direction 
for future research. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Although prior studies have examined variation in discount rates by domain (e.g., 
Estle et al., 2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003) and across individuals (e.g., Chao, Szrek, 
Pereira, Pauly, & Center, 2009; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & 
Knutson, 2009; Kirby et al., 2002), this is the first study to our knowledge that 
simultaneously models and predicts both between- and within-individual differences in 
domain-specific temporal discount rates. In addition to corroborating Chapman’s (1996) 
findings that temporal discounting is domain-specific, we provide a possible explanation 
for this phenomenon. Specifically, we show that temptation partially explains domain-
specific temporal discounting: an individual may have a high discount rate for candy but 
a low discount rate for beer in part because she finds candy more tempting.
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Chapter 3: Domain-Specific Impulsivity in School-Age Children 
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Abstract 
Impulsivity is a salient individual difference in children with well-established predictive 
validity for life outcomes. The current investigation proposes that impulsive behaviors 
vary systematically by domain. In a series of studies with ethnically and 
socioeconomically diverse samples of middle school students, we find that schoolwork-
related and interpersonal-related impulsivity, as observed by teachers, parents, and the 
students themselves, are distinct, moderately correlated behavioral tendencies. Each 
demonstrates differentiated relationships with dimensions of childhood temperament, Big 
Five personality factors, and outcomes, such as sociometric popularity, report card 
grades, and classroom conduct. Implications for theoretical conceptions of impulsivity as 
well as for practical applications (e.g., domain-specific interventions) are discussed. 
 
Keywords: impulsivity, self-control, domain-specificity, academic achievement 
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Domain-Specific Impulsivity in School-Age Children 
Impulsivity is an individual difference of special interest to both psychologists 
and educators. Defined as the inability to regulate behavior, attention, and emotions in the 
service of long-term goals, impulsivity
26—and its obverse, self-control—has held a 
central role in conceptions of socialization and development at least since Freud (1922). 
Two decades earlier, in a series of lectures entitled Talks to Teachers, James (1899) 
posited that the question of how conflicting goals were reconciled—the “compounding of 
our impulsions with our inhibitions” —was of central importance for both theoretical and 
pedagogical reasons (p. 178). The ability to regulate oneself, with decreasing reliance on 
others to enforce behavioral standards, is now widely recognized as a foundational skill 
for a wide array of developmental processes (Eisenberg et al., 2004; Kochanska, Murray, 
& Harlan, 2000; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). 
Empirical interest in impulsivity has increased in recent years. By 2009, more 
than 3% of all PsycInfo articles were indexed by impulsivity or a closely-related keyword 
(Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Conspicuously absent from this burgeoning literature is any 
serious investigation of how impulsive behaviors in children might vary systematically 
by domain. The omission is not surprising. Contemporary temperament and personality 
research tends to focus on individual differences that are relatively stable across time and 
kinds of situations (Mischel, 2004). To an extent, viewing individual differences through 
a domain-general lens is justified: It is true, important, and interesting that some children 
are generally more impulsive than others. On the other hand, it seems equally plausible, 
                                                            
26 The terms impulsivity and self-control are used differently by different authors (Duckworth & Kern, 
2011). Our definition of the term self-control corresponds to Rothbart and Rueda’s (2005) and Eisenberg et 
al.’s (2004) concept effortful control and emphasizes the volitional, effortful performance of subdominant 
responses rather than dominant, immediately rewarding responses in order to achieve long-term reward. 
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important, and interesting that, for instance, some children particularly struggle with 
controlling their temper, while others are especially prone to daydreaming during class. 
Mischel and colleagues have argued persuasively against considering situation-
specific variance in behavior as merely “noise” or “error” that obscures domain-general 
differences in personality (Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002). Instead, 
distinctive situation-behavior profiles constitute an important locus of consistency in 
personality. For instance, in the classroom doing quiet work, a child may be consistently 
self-controlled, but in social situations involving interpersonal conflict, she may be more 
impulsive. As Bandura (1999) has pointed out, “Given the highly conditional nature of 
human functioning, it is unrealistic to expect personality measures cast in nonconditional 
generalities to shed much light on the contribution of personal factors to psychosocial 
functioning in different task domains under diverse circumstances across all situations” 
(p. 12). Susan Harter’s work, for instance, exemplifies the important contributions a 
domain-specific approach can make toward understanding individual differences in 
children’s self-concept (Harter, 1982; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997). 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity in Children 
In our review of the developmental literature, we found only one investigation of 
domain-specific impulsivity in children: Humphrey (1982) asked fourth and fifth grade 
teachers to rate their students on 15 specific impulsive behaviors. Factor analyses 
suggested two related (r = .61) but distinct factors, labeled by Humphrey as 
“cognitive/personal” and “behavioral/interpersonal” behaviors. Items Humphrey 
considered impulsive cognitive acts included “fails to complete assignments when the 
adult is not watching” and “is distracted from work or responsibilities”; examples of 
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interpersonal impulsivity included “gets into arguments and/or fights with other children” 
and “talks out of turn.” Two other studies provide further support for this distinction. In a 
study on teaching ratings of classroom behavior, Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber (1993) 
suggested distinct factors for “Attention Span-Restlessness” and “Cooperation-
Compliance.” Similarly, in a study on teacher and parent ratings of temperament, Caspi, 
Henry, McGee, Moffitt, and Silva (1995) found factors which they labeled 
“Distractability” and “Irritability.” While the discovery of these factors supports our 
claim, none of these studies systematically substantiated these factors as distinct domain-
specific constructs (e.g., comparing the predictive validities of the factors for predicting 
domain-specific outcomes). 
Development of a Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale for Children 
In light of these prior studies, our major hypothesis in the current investigation is 
that for school-age children, impulsive behavior in the social context is related to, yet 
distinct from, the impulsive behavior in the schoolwork context. To test this hypothesis, 
we developed a novel questionnaire called the Impulsivity Scale for Children (ISC). In 
addition to developing a scale that could be used as both a domain-specific and a general 
measure (by averaging subscales), five design objectives guided our efforts. First, unlike 
Humphrey (1982), we aimed to identify specific behaviors nominated by school-age 
children themselves as indicating lapses in self-control. In doing so, we would avoid 
projecting our own preconceived (and possibly inaccurate) notions about behaviors that 
entailed a subjective struggle to overcome short-term temptation in exchange for long-
term gain. This atheoretic, bottom-up approach relies on descriptors nominated by 
individuals other than the researcher (Church, 2001). Second, we sought to include 
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behaviors of sufficient frequency and consequence for overall functioning to warrant 
measurement. Third, we sought to create parallel student-, parent-, and teacher-report 
scales. Fourth, we wanted a brief scale so that participants—especially teachers reporting 
on many students—would not be overburdened. 
Finally, to avoid reference group bias—the tendency to use one’s particular 
reference group to evaluate oneself when responding to self-report questionnaires (Heine, 
Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002)—we wanted to design a response scale with 
objectively-defined frequency anchors. Most questionnaires employed in psychological 
research use Likert-type response categories such as “very true,” “often,” and “about 
average.” However, the interpretation of such categories can vary widely among 
individuals. For example, wide disparities in intuitive interpretations of frequency 
categories have been documented among college students (Porter, 2009). Asked to 
describe how often they engaged in various activities using standard categories (i.e., 
“never,” “occasionally,” “often,” or “very often”), undergraduates were later asked the 
same question by indicating the number of times they had engaged in the activity. Among 
students who described themselves as “often” in asking others to read something they 
wrote, 18% specified “once or twice a year,” 33% specified “3 to 6 times a year,” and 
35% specified “1 to 2 times a month” (Pace & Friedlander, 1982, p. 271). When 
respondents randomly vary in how they respond, measurement error increases. An even 
more pernicious problem emerges when there is systematic bias in how response 
categories are interpreted by respondents, which can lead to biased, not just 
underpowered, estimates of associations with other variables. Given these concerns, we 
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worked with the same panel of teachers who assisted in item selection to create response 
categories that specified objective, discrete periods. 
Current Investigation 
To test our hypothesis that interpersonal impulsivity is related to yet distinct from 
schoolwork impulsivity, we developed a novel questionnaire. Across three studies, we 
sought evidence for the validity of the Impulsivity Scale for Children (ISC) and 
substantiated distinct domains of impulsivity. In Studies 1 and 2, we conducted 
exploratory factor analyses to assess the dimensionality of the scale. In Study 3, we 
conducted confirmatory factor analyses and compared a domain-specific two-factor 
model to a domain-general one-factor model. In all studies, we examined convergent and 
discriminant validity, using published measures of temperament, personality, and IQ. 
Likewise, in all three studies, we compared domain-specific predictive validity for 
outcomes, such as GPA and classroom conduct. When possible, we conducted 
longitudinal analyses examining domain-specific predictive validity for changes in 
outcomes. 
Study 1 
 In Study 1, we administered student- and teacher-report versions of the ISC. We 
first conducted exploratory factor analyses to ascertain the subscales. Next, we examined 
convergent validity with the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 
2004), a widely-used domain-general self-control scale, and discriminant validity with 
IQ. Finally, we examined the predictive validity of the subscales with GPA, predicting 
that schoolwork impulsivity would be a better predictor than interpersonal impulsivity. In 
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addition, we hypothesized that schoolwork impulsivity would be a better predictor of 
changes in GPA over the school year. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were fifth through seventh grade students at two public 
schools in Philadelphia. About 83% of the 561 students chose to participate. Participants 
were not significantly different from non-participants in terms of gender, race, age at 
assessment, or household income. Of the 464 consented students, 10 were omitted from 
analyses because both teachers and students did not complete the study measures (final N 
= 453, mean age = 12.5 years, SD = 1.2). About 94% were Black, 4% of participants 
were Latino, and 2% were other ethnicities; 51% were female. The median estimated 
household income was $30,349 (SD = $14,181). 
Procedure and Measures. Students and teachers completed consent forms and 
questionnaires during the fall semester. For each student, two teachers completed 
informant ratings of impulsivity and self-control. At the conclusion of the school year, 
outcome data were collected from school records. 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity. Following Buss and Craik (1983), we solicited 
anonymous open-ended responses from several hundred public and private middle school 
children about behaviors that exemplified self-control or failures thereof in their own 
lives. The resultant list of 414 nominated behaviors was reviewed by a panel of seven 
public and private middle school teachers, who rated each behavior, using a 3-point 
frequency scale where 1 = Very common and very important to overall functioning, 2 = 
Either very common but unimportant or very rare but important, and 3 = Not common 
and not important. We averaged these ratings, and retained the top 62 items (15%; cutoff 
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of 1.33). To further reduce the number of items, we eliminated redundancy by 
paraphrasing and merging conceptually similar items. Finally, we selected items and 
adjusted language to create student, teacher, and parent versions that were as closely 
matched on content as possible. Ultimately, we retained eight items (see Table 1). With 
input from the teachers, we identified five frequency levels designed to be intuitively 
meaningful and also to allow for maximal distribution in observed student behavior: 1 = 
almost never, 2 = about once per month, 3 = about 2 to 3 times per month, 4 = about once 
per week, and 5 = at least once per day. 
Students completed the ISC. Teachers completed a teacher-report version, which 
included items starting with “This student…” instead of “I…” Internal reliability 
coefficients for the ISC and its subscales ranged from .63 to .95 (avg. = .86; see Table 1). 
Domain-General Self-control. Students completed the Brief Self-Control Scale 
(Tangney, et al., 2004), a 13-item questionnaire that includes self-control items endorsed 
on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = not like me at all and 5 = very much like me (e.g., “I 
am good at resisting temptation”). Teachers completed an informant version. Observed 
internal reliability coefficients were .75, .97, and .96, for the student and teachers’ 
ratings, respectively. 
IQ. Students completed Raven’s Progress Matrices (Raven, 1948), a widely-used 
test of nonverbal intelligence. The test comprises 60 matrices, each of which has one 
element missing. The task in each case is to select correctly the piece that completes the 
pattern from a set of alternatives. Children were given as much time to finish as they 
needed; all finished within 45 minutes. Because standardized scores are not available for 
 101 
 
 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, we regressed raw scores on participant age and saved the 
standardized residuals, which we then used as an age-corrected intelligence score. 
GPA. We collected course grades from school records. We calculated GPA for 
each marking period (quarters for one school and trimesters for the other) and for final 
GPA by averaging grades from all major academic courses, including math, science, 
language arts, and social studies classes. 
Socioeconomic Status and Demographic Variables. We obtained data on gender, 
ethnicity, birthdate, and home addresses from school records. Using home addresses in 
conjunction with U.S. Census bureau data, we estimated the median household income 
by census block for each participant. 
Results and Discussion 
Exploratory Factor Analysis. We conducted separate exploratory factor 
analyses (EFAs) for the student and teacher versions of the ISC. We used the squared 
multiple correlation method to compute prior communality estimates and set the 
minimum factor loading criterion to .40 (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). Because we expected 
domains of self-control to share common components and therefore to be correlated, we 
used oblique promax rotation (k = 4). To determine the number of factors to extract, we 
used parallel analyses (Horn, 1965), scree tests (Cattel, 1966), the minimum average 
partial criterion (Velicer, 1976), Bartlett’s chi-square test (Geweke & Singleton, 1980), 
and the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960). These tests suggested extracting 1 to 4 factors 
(average = 2). We selected the two-factor solution because it was psychologically 
meaningful and consistent across student and teacher items. We labeled the first factor 
interpersonal impulsivity and the second schoolwork impulsivity. As shown in Table 1, 
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the four-item subscales for schoolwork and interpersonal impulsivity demonstrated 
adequate internal consistency, α = .63 to .95, avg. = .86. The schoolwork and 
interpersonal factor correlations were r = .60, .47, and .40 for the student- and teacher 
versions of the scale, respectively. 
Composite Scores. To increase reliability and minimize multicollinearity in 
subsequent analyses, we created composite scores by averaging the student- and teacher-
report ratings. Associations among ratings were generally moderate to large for 
interpersonal impulsivity (avg. r = .47, ps < .001), schoolwork impulsivity (avg. r = .31, 
ps < .05), and general impulsivity (8-item ISC; avg. r = .41, ps < .001), as well as self-
control, avg. r = .44, ps < .001. Following Nunnally (1978), we found the reliability of 
these composites ranged from .93 to .97. 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity. The ISC and its subscales demonstrated 
convergent validity with the Brief Self-Control Scale, rs = -.72 to -.88, ps < .001. To test 
discriminant validity, we examined correlations between the ISC and its subscales and 
IQ, rs = -.11 to -.15, ps < .05. Following procedures outlined by Meng, Rosenthal, and 
Rubin (1992), we confirmed that correlations between impulsivity and self-control were 
significantly stronger than corresponding correlations between measures of impulsivity 
and IQ, ps < .001. 
Domain-Specific Associations. To compare the predictive validities of 
interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity, we fit a simultaneous multiple regression 
model predicting GPA. As predicted, schoolwork impulsivity (β = -.59, p < .001) was a 
better predictor of GPA than interpersonal impulsivity (β = -.06, p = .17), p < .001 for the 
difference in βs. We also fit a simultaneous multiple regression model predicting final 
 103 
 
 
marking period GPA from both interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity as well as first 
marking period GPA. This allowed us to examine the variance uniquely accounted for by 
each type of impulsivity in changes in the outcomes over time. As predicted, schoolwork 
impulsivity predicted decreases in GPA over the school year (β = -.18, p < .001), but 
interpersonal impulsivity (β = .03, p = .42) did not, p = .003 for the difference in βs. 
These results were practically identical when controlling for IQ. 
Study 2 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the validity of the student and teacher 
versions of the ISC. In Study 2, we administered a parent-report version. We conducted 
exploratory factor analyses, then examined convergent validity with two self-control 
scales: the Brief Self-Control Scale used in Study 1 and a more widely used child 
behavior scale, the Social Skills Rating System. Study 1 used IQ to examine discriminant 
validity with impulsivity, but it could be argued that a more relevant test would compare 
ratings of impulsivity with ratings on another trait rather than an objective performance 
measure, such as cognitive ability. Consequently, we asked parents to rate openness to 
experience for discriminant validity. Finally, in addition to GPA, we assessed hours 
studying and watching television as behavioral outcomes of impulsivity (Duckworth & 
Seligman, 2005). We predicted that schoolwork impulsivity, compared to interpersonal 
impulsivity, would be a better predictor of GPA, hours studying, and hours watching 
television. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 166 parents of fourth through eighth grade 
students. We recruited and paid participants $0.75 through Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
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Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing website where requesters can hire workers to complete 
tasks (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). About 84% of participants were White, 7% 
were Black, 4% were Asian, 2% were Hispanic, and 3% were other ethnicities; 63% were 
female. 
Measures and Procedure. 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity. Parents completed a parent-report version of the 
ISC. Each item started with “My child…” instead of “I…” Internal reliability coefficients 
for the ISC and its subscales ranged from .77 to .85 (avg. = .81; see Table 1). 
Self-control. Parents completed a parent-report version of the Brief Self-Control 
Scale (Tangney, et al., 2004) described in Study 1. The observed internal reliability was 
.87. 
Parents also completed select items from the Social Skills Rating System (SSRS; 
Gresham & Elliot, 1990). Our own factor analyses as well as independent research on 
separate samples (Whiteside, McCarthy, & Miller, 2007) failed to replicate the original 
published factor structure of the SSRS. Therefore, we used 9 face-valid self-control items 
(e.g., “Controls temper in conflict situations,” “Attends to your instructions”) from the 
parent version of the SSRS, which in prior published studies has demonstrated strong 
convergent validity with other questionnaire measures of self-control as well as 
predictive validity for theoretically relevant outcomes (Duckworth, Kim, & Tsukayama, 
in prep; Duckworth, Quinn, & Tsukayama, in press; Tsukayama, Toomey, Faith, & 
Duckworth, 2010). The observed internal reliability of the 9-items used was .70. 
Openness to Experience. Parents completed a parent-report version of the 
Openness to Experience subscale of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 
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1999). Parents endorsed items (e.g., “My child is curious about many different things”) 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = not like me at all and 5 = very much like me. 
The observed internal reliability was .84. 
GPA, Hours Studying, and Hours Watching TV. Parents were asked “Which of 
the following statements best describes your child's grades on his/her last report card?” 
where 1 = Mostly A's to 8 = Mostly below D. We also asked “About how many hours per 
day does your child spend on the computer, watching TV or playing video games?” and 
“About how many hours per day does your child spend studying?” 
Results and Discussion 
Exploratory Factor Analysis. Using the same methods described in Study 1, we 
conducted an EFA on the parent-report version of the ISC. Factor extraction tests 
suggested a two-factor solution that was consistent with the models in Study 1 (see Table 
1). The factor correlation was r = .65. 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity. The ISC and its subscales demonstrated 
convergent validity with the Brief Self-Control Scale, rs = -.60 to -.71, ps < .001, as well 
as the Social Skills Rating System, rs = -.50 to -.62, ps < .001. To test discriminant 
validity, we examined correlations between openness to experience and the ISC (rs = -.22 
to -.31, p < .001), the Brief Self-Control Scale (r = .40, p < .001), and the Social Skills 
Rating System (r = .37, p < .001). Correlations among impulsivity/self-control measures 
were significantly higher than correlations between measures of impulsivity/self-control 
and openness to experience, ps < .001. 
Domain-Specific Associations. To compare the predictive validities of 
interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity, we fit simultaneous multiple regression 
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models predicting each outcome. As predicted, schoolwork impulsivity, but not 
interpersonal impulsivity, predicted GPA (β = -.31, p < .01), hours studying (β = -.16, p < 
.05), and hours watching TV (β = .20). However, due to the relatively small sample size 
(N = 166), the differences in predictive validity were not always significant, indicating 
that schoolwork impulsivity was not necessarily a significantly stronger predictor than 
interpersonal impulsivity (see Table 3). 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 provided preliminary support for the validity of the ISC. 
However, we see two limitations of these studies. First, student-, teacher-, and parent 
versions were not simultaneously examined in the same sample. While we assume that 
ratings from the three sources would correlate, this could not be empirically tested. 
Second, the two studies were not ethnically diverse—participants in Study 1 were 
predominantly Black (94%), while participants in Study 2 were predominantly White 
(84%). A more comprehensive study would include a diverse sample. Therefore in Study 
3, we replicated and extended our findings with an ethnically and socioeconomically 
diverse sample of public and private school students as well as their teachers and parents. 
Furthermore, we assessed childhood temperament and the Big Five personality taxonomy 
in order to locate the constructs of interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity within a 
nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
After conducting Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFAs) to test the two-factor 
structure found in Studies 1 and 2, we assessed convergent validity with a domain-
general measure of self-control and discriminant validity with IQ. Finally, we examined 
the relationships among schoolwork and interpersonal impulsivity and dimensions of 
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temperament, personality, and school outcomes. Formally, we predicted that 
interpersonal impulsivity would be a better predictor of aggression, frustration, surgency, 
agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism, and popularity, whereas schoolwork 
impulsivity would be a better predictor of activation control, attention, conscientiousness, 
openness to experience, and GPA. We did not have strong predictions for conduct grades 
since they were based on both homework completion and classroom conduct. Among the 
dimensions of temperament, we predicted that aggression would be the best predictor of 
interpersonal impulsivity, whereas activation control and/or attention would be the best 
predictor/s of schoolwork impulsivity. Similarly, among the Big Five traits, we predicted 
that agreeableness would be the best predictor of interpersonal impulsivity, whereas 
conscientiousness would be the best predictor of schoolwork impulsivity. Finally, in 
addition to being a better predictor of final GPA, we hypothesized that schoolwork 
impulsivity would be a better predictor of changes in GPA over the school year. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were fifth through eighth grade students at one private 
and two public middle schools in New York. About 92% of the 835 students chose to 
participate. Participants were not significantly different from non-participants in terms of 
gender, race, age at assessment, or household income. Of the 772 consented students, 60 
were omitted from analyses because both parents and students did not complete the study 
measures (final N = 712, mean age = 11.9 years, SD = 1.3). About 45% of participants 
were Latino, 26% were Black, 23% were White, 3% were Asian, and 3% were other 
races; 53% were female. The median estimated household income for this sample was 
$28,611 (SD = $38,877). 
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Procedure and Measures. Participants completed measures during the fall 
semester. Students and teachers completed the questionnaires on site at their respective 
schools. Parents completed hard-copy or online questionnaires. At the conclusion of the 
school year, outcome data were collected from school records. 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity. Students, teachers, and parents completed 
respective versions of the ISC. Associations among ratings were generally moderate to 
large for interpersonal impulsivity (avg. r = .31, ps < .001), schoolwork impulsivity (avg. 
r = .28, ps < .001), and general impulsivity (8-item ISC; avg. r = .31, ps < .001).  Internal 
reliability coefficients for the ISC and its subscales ranged from .63 to .91 (avg. = .81; see 
Table 2). We created composite scores by averaging the student-, teacher-, and parent-
report ratings. The internal reliability of these composite were .88, .86, and .92 for 
interpersonal impulsivity, schoolwork impulsivity, and (8-item) ISC respectively. 
Domain-general self-control. Parents and teachers rated participants on a single 
item, “How self-controlled is this child?” using a 7-point scale where 1 = very low in self-
control and 7 = very high in self-control. Parent and teacher ratings of domain-general 
self-control were correlated at r = .32, p < .001. We averaged these scores to create a 
composite measure of self-control. 
IQ. Students completed the same measure of IQ—Raven’s Progress Matrices 
(Raven, 1948)—used in Study 1. 
Temperament. Students and parents completed subscales of theoretical relevance 
to self-control from the Early Adolescent Temperament Questionnaire-Revised Short 
Form (Putnam, Ellis, & Rothbart, 2001). Specifically, we administered activation control 
(e.g., “I finish my homework before the due date”), attention (e.g., “I pay close attention 
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when someone tells me how to do something”), aggression (e.g., “I tend to be rude to 
people I don’t like”), frustration (e.g., “I get irritated when I have to stop doing 
something that I am enjoying”), and surgency (e.g., “I sometimes like doing things that 
are a bit frightening”). Observed internal reliabilities ranged from .53 to .80 for student 
ratings and .58 to .65 for parent ratings of students. Student and parent ratings for each 
temperament dimension were correlated, avg. r = .24, ps < .05. We averaged student and 
parent ratings to create composite scores. The internal reliability of these composites 
ranged from .81 to .89 (avg. = .86). 
Big Five personality. Students and teachers completed the Big Five Inventory 
(John & Srivastava, 1999), a widely used 44-item measure of the Big Five personality 
traits. Students endorsed items (e.g., “I see myself as someone who is full of energy”) 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale, where 1 = not like me at all and 5 = very much like me. 
Observed internal reliabilities of the BFI subscales measuring open mindedness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism ranged from .70 to .73 
for student ratings and .85 to .94 for teacher ratings of students. We created composite 
measures for each of the Big Five dimensions by averaging teacher- and self-report 
ratings. Correlations between student and teacher ratings on each of the Big Five ratings 
averaged r = .27, ps < .05. The internal reliability of these composite ranged from .80 to 
.91 (avg. = .87). 
Popularity. Students completed questionnaires in which they responded to the 
following prompt: “We are interested in peer relationships among children your age. 
Among the classmates in your grade and at this school, list the three friends that you 
hang out with the most. The order in which you list these friends does not matter. If you 
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feel like you really only hang out with one or two friends, just list their names. If you feel 
like you hang out with four or more, just pick three for this list.” We computed a 
student’s popularity by counting the number of times s/he appeared on other students’ 
lists of friends. 
GPA. We collected final course grades from school records. We calculated GPA 
for each quarter and for final GPA by averaging grades from all major academic courses, 
including math, science, language arts, and social studies classes. 
Conduct grades. As part of regular school practice, teachers at both public 
schools rated student homework and conduct in each class using a single 5-point scale, 
where 1 = unsatisfactory, 2 = needs improvement, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = good, and 5 = 
excellent. We calculated conduct for each marking period and for final conduct by 
averaging grades from all major academic courses, including math, science, language 
arts, and social studies classes. 
Socioeconomic Status and Demographic Variables. We obtained data on gender, 
ethnicity, birthdate, and home addresses from school records. Using home addresses in 
conjunction with U.S. Census bureau data, we estimated the median household income 
by census block for each participant. 
Results and Discussion 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Separate CFAs on the student, parent, and 
teacher-report ISC items confirmed that domain-specific two-factor models fit the data 
better than domain-general one-factor models, ps < .001 (see Table 2). In the two-factor 
models, items were allowed to load freely on their respective factor, the factor loadings 
with other factors were set to zero, and the covariance between the factors was freely 
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estimated. In the one-factor models, all items were allowed to load freely on a single 
factor. Factors were scaled by setting the variance equal to 1.0. All factor loadings were 
significant at p < .001. 
The hypothesized two-factor models fit the data adequately (see Table 2). 
Following recommendations suggested by Kline (2004), we considered CFI values 
greater than .90, RMSEA values less than .10, and SRMR values less than .10 to indicate 
acceptable fit. All CFI estimates were ≥ .90 and all SRMR estimates were ≤ .07. The 
RMSEA for student- and parent-report versions of the scale were .097 and .089, 
respectively. However, the RMSEA for the teacher-report model was .162.
27
 Although 
the RMSEA was greater than expected, this indication of poor fit may have resulted from 
small model size (Kenny & McCoach, 2003), and large factor loadings (Browne, 
MacCallum, Kim, Andersen, & Glaser, 2002; Miles & Shevlin, 2007), rather than actual 
model misspecification. 
Finally, we tested for measurement invariance across gender, age, and school type 
by estimating multiple-group CFA models and constraining the factor loadings to be 
equal across groups (i.e., males vs. females, median-split younger vs. older students, and 
private vs. public schools). Using ΔCFI ≤ .01 as a guideline (see Cheung & Rensvold, 
2002), we found that the same factor structure held across gender (ΔCFIs ≤ .01) and age 
(ΔCFIs ≤ .005). While the factor structure appeared to hold across school type for 
                                                            
27 Allowing the item “This student interrupted other students in discussion” to load on both factors, 
allowing its error to covary with “This student's mind wandered when he or she should have been 
listening,” and allowing the error for “This student did not remember what his or her teacher told him or 
her to do” to co-vary with the error for “This student's mind wandered when he or she should have been 
listening” reduced the RMSEA to .085. 
 
 112 
 
 
students (ΔCFI < .002) and parents (ΔCFI = .01), it may have differed for teachers 
(ΔCFIs = .013). 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity. The ISC and its subscales demonstrated 
convergent validity with domain-general self-control, rs = -.60 to -.70, ps < .001. In 
support of discriminant validity, correlations between the ISC subscales and IQ were 
significantly weaker (rs = -.18 to -.23), ps < .001 for the difference in rs. 
Domain-Specific Associations. To compare the predictive validities of 
interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity, we fit simultaneous multiple regression 
models predicting each outcome. Because popularity was a count variable (i.e., non-
negative integers) and non-normally distributed, we conducted regression analysis with a 
generalized linear model (GzLM), specifying a negative binomial reference distribution 
and log link (Hardin & Hilbe, 2003). To facilitate interpretation of incidence rate ratios 
(IRRs), we standardized predictors prior to model estimation. Finally, we compared the 
predictive validity of the different dimensions of childhood temperament and the Big 
Five personality traits on interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity in separate models for 
each set and outcome (e.g., Big Five predicting interpersonal impulsivity). 
As shown in Table 3, in general alignment with our predictions, schoolwork and 
interpersonal impulsivity were differentially related to dimensions of temperament, Big 
Five personality traits, and school outcomes. Interpersonal impulsivity was more strongly 
related to aggression (β = .51, p < .001), frustration (β = .26, p < .001), surgency (β = .19, 
p < .001), extraversion (β = .37, p < .001), agreeableness (β = -.59, p < .001), and 
neuroticism (β = .32, p < .001), ps < .05 for the differences in βs. On the other hand, 
schoolwork impulsivity was more strongly related to activation control (β = -.38, p < 
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.001), attention (β = -.35, p < .001), openness (β = -.21, p < .001), conscientiousness (β = 
-.68, p < .001), and GPA (β = -.46, p < .001), ps < .01 for the differences in βs. Contrary 
to prediction, however, popularity was not more strongly associated with interpersonal 
impulsivity (β = .02, p = .72) than with schoolwork impulsivity (β = -.12, p = .063), p = 
.25 for the difference in βs. While their zero-order correlations with popularity were 
significant (ps < .05), neither interpersonal nor schoolwork impulsivity were significant 
predictors in the generalized linear model. Both interpersonal (β = -.30, p < .001) and 
schoolwork impulsivity (β = -.42, p < .001) were associated with conduct. 
As predicted, aggression (β = .39, p < .001) was the best predictor of interpersonal 
impulsivity compared to the other dimensions of temperament, ps < .001 for the 
difference in βs. While activation control (β = -.26, p < .001) and attention (β = -.22, p < 
.001) were the best predictors of schoolwork impulsivity (p < .05 for most of the 
difference in βs), attention did not explain significantly more variance than frustration (β 
= .14, p < .001), p = .15 for the difference in absolute βs. Among the Big Five personality 
factors, agreeableness was the best predictor (β = -.49, p < .001) of interpersonal 
impulsivity (ps < .001 for the difference in βs), whereas conscientiousness was the best 
predictor (β = -.70, p < .001) of schoolwork impulsivity, ps < .001 for the difference in 
βs. 
To compare the predictive validities of each type of impulsivity for changes in 
GPA and conduct, we fit simultaneous multiple regression models controlling for initial 
levels of outcomes and including both interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity as 
predictors. As predicted, schoolwork impulsivity problems predicted decreases in GPA 
over the school year (β = -.16, p < .001), but interpersonal impulsivity (β = -.03, p = .47) 
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did not, p = .05 for the differences in βs. Schoolwork (β = -.13, p = .005) and 
interpersonal impulsivity (β = -.11, p = .01) each accounted for comparable variance in 
changes in classroom conduct over the course of the school year, p = .69 for the 
differences in βs. These results were practically identical when controlling for IQ. 
General Discussion 
Casual observation suggests that children who reliably resist certain kinds of 
temptations can be quite impulsive about others. The present study provides empirical 
support for domain-specific impulsivity in school-age children and suggests that the 
interpersonal and schoolwork domains are of particular relevance during this 
developmental period. Impulsive behaviors in both domains appear to contribute to 
teachers’ and parents’ domain-general impressions of self-control. However, factor 
analyses of student, teacher, and parent inventories of impulsive behaviors indicated that 
behaviors cluster within these two domains. Moreover, as theoretically predicted, 
whereas interpersonal impulsivity was most strongly related (inversely) to agreeableness, 
schoolwork impulsivity was most strongly related (inversely) to conscientiousness. 
Similarly, whereas the temperament dimension of aggression was most strongly related to 
interpersonal impulsivity, activation control and attention were most strongly related 
(inversely) to schoolwork impulsivity. 
As predicted, schoolwork-related lapses in self-control (e.g., allowing one’s mind 
to wander instead of listening) played a more important role than interpersonal 
impulsivity (e.g., interrupting others) in predicting academic performance. Specifically, 
schoolwork impulsivity, but not interpersonal impulsivity, predicted less hours spent 
studying and more hours spent watching television. Furthermore, schoolwork 
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impulsivity, but not interpersonal impulsivity, predicted decreases in GPA over the 
course of the school year when assessing the effects of both predictors. Both types of 
impulsivity predicted decreases in teacher-ratings of classroom conduct over the school 
year, suggesting that interpersonal impulsivity gives rise to consequential problems for 
school-age children, even if it does not affect report card grades. 
Finally, the ISC accomplished our five design goals: (1) the items are behaviors 
nominated by the children themselves as indicating lapses in self-control, (2) the items 
reflect common and consequential behaviors, (3) we created parallel student-, parent-, 
and teacher-report scales, (4) we developed a brief scale to minimize the burden on 
participants, and (5) we designed a response scale with objectively-defined frequency 
anchors. In combination, these five design features should increase the usefulness of this 
questionnaire not only for research purposes but also for formative assessment (i.e., 
providing useful feedback for identifying improvement goals). 
Theoretical Implications 
Our proposition that impulsive behaviors vary according to context (i.e., domain 
specificity) is nevertheless compatible with the observation that such behaviors are also 
correlated across different situations (i.e., domain generality). Like intelligence and other 
traits, impulsivity seems organized hierarchically, with variance that can be partitioned 
with increasing specificity at lower levels of organization. Stability across situations 
suggests common processes are involved; systematic variance across situations suggests 
that domain-specific processes are also relevant.  
Why do impulsive behaviors cluster by domain? We see at least three possible 
explanations, each with distinct theoretical implications. One possibility is that a single 
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regulatory process (or common set of processes) governs impulses of all kinds, and what 
varies by domain is impulse strength. Oscar Wilde once quipped, “I can resist everything 
but temptation.” Less eloquently, we propose that impulses which rage strongly in one 
child may be quiet in another. This account suggests that a child who loses his temper but 
not his homework may experience stronger urges when arguing with other people than 
when sitting down to study. Similarly, some children may be more intrinsically interested 
in what their teachers are saying, dampening, in effect, the lure of goofing off, 
daydreaming, and so on. 
A second possibility is that what varies by domain may be the motivation to 
control impulses. To the extent that the subjectively perceived harmful consequences of 
impulsive behaviors vary by domain, so, too, should the expressed behavior. For 
instance, some children may care more (or less) about report card grades and other 
academic outcomes than about their social relationships.  
Alternatively, there may be separate psychological (and presumably 
neurobiological) processes that are involved in the regulation of schoolwork and 
interpersonal behavior. Most of the schoolwork-related impulsive behaviors on our scale 
imply disregulation of attention in some way, whereas most of the interpersonal-related 
impulsive behaviors suggest disregulation of emotion. Thus, it may be that what varies 
across domains is the kind of impulse and, in turn, the corresponding regulatory system. 
Against this possibility, a recent review of neuroimaging studies suggests that prefrontal 
brain regions supporting self-control are domain-general, whereas the subcortical regions 
representing impulses (i.e., “the reward, salience, and emotional value of a stimulus”) 
vary depending on the domain (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011, p. 134). In further support 
 117 
 
 
of this explanation, Tsukayama and colleagues (in press) found that domain-specific 
impulsive behavior in adults was minimally explained by perceptions of the harmful 
consequences of behavior once impulse strength was statistically controlled. Rather, 
consistent with Oscar Wilde’s insight, what explained domain-specific impulsivity in 
adults was the degree to which behaviors such as eating junk food, lazing in front of the 
television, smoking cigarettes, and drinking to excess were, regardless of their associated 
harm, subjectively wanted and enjoyed. 
Practical implications 
Many children who act impulsively in the interpersonal domain are more self-
controlled in the schoolwork domain and vice-versa. To illustrate this possibility, we 
categorized participants into thirds (high, medium, and low) based on their schoolwork 
and interpersonal impulsivity scores. As shown in Table 4, roughly half of the 
participants fell along the diagonal (i.e., high, medium, or low in both types of 
impulsivity). For the remaining half, scores for schoolwork and interpersonal impulsivity 
diverged. We see two important practical implications of domain specificity in 
impulsivity among school-age children. First, teachers providing feedback to students and 
parents about behavioral competencies and challenges should distinguish between types 
of impulsive behavior. The ISC developed in close collaboration with both private and 
public school teachers could be a useful tool for both formative assessment and screening 
for targeted intervention. Second, direct interventions aimed at reducing impulsive 
behavior among children might be tailored to address domain-specific problems. 
Strategies that help students avoid distractions to their academic work (e.g., Duckworth, 
Grant, Loew, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, 2011) may differ substantially from those that 
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help students keep their tempers in check (e.g., Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & 
Mischel, in press). 
Although we focused on the domain-specific aspects of the ISC in this 
investigation, it should be noted that it can be used as both a domain-specific measure, 
and by summing subscale scores, of impulsive behavior in school-age children. Indeed, 
the ISC has already been employed in several studies in our lab (e.g., Duckworth, et al., 
in prep; Duckworth, et al., in press) as well as studies conducted by our colleagues (e.g., 
Suchodoletz, Larsen, Faesche, & Gunzenhauser, in prep; Wu, Duckworth, Kim, & Chen, 
in prep). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate domain-specificity in 
school-age children. Like any empirical effort, this study’s limitations suggest profitable 
directions for future work. First, while the samples we used were collectively 
socioeconomically and ethnically diverse, replication studies, ideally with nationally 
representative samples (and, indeed, in non-US countries) are needed to confirm the 
degree to which our findings generalize.  
Second, in the current investigation, we found two domains of impulsive 
behavior, whereas a study of adults found six domains: work, interpersonal relationships, 
drugs and alcohol, food, exercise, and finances (Tsukayama, et al., in press). We 
hypothesize that this discrepancy is due to age-related differences in opportunity, 
temptation, and perceived harm. In other words, the average school-age child presumably 
does not have self-control problems with drugs and alcohol, food, exercise, and finances 
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because they are not frequently encountered, not tempting, or not perceived as harmful. 
Longitudinal studies could test this prediction. 
Third, while we designed the ISC with objectively-defined frequency anchors, we 
did not show that it is less susceptible to the reference-group bias in the current 
investigation. However, a cross-cultural study suggests that the ISC shows a bigger 
difference than the Brief Self-Control Scale between Taiwanese and American 
schoolchildren (Wu, et al., in prep). 
Finally, experimental research testing domain-specific interventions would more 
clearly elucidate causal relationships between domain-specific impulsivity and 
downstream outcomes. Properly designed, such translational research could both further 
the basic science of self-control and also serve an important practical purpose. 
Conclusion 
Research questions of both theoretical and practical importance are suggested by 
the insight that children who struggle to exercise self-control in the schoolwork context 
do not always struggle with self-control in interpersonal situations. Do self-control 
processes, motivation to exert self-control, or impulse strength vary by domain? Of 
consequence to lifespan development, does self-control begin as a relatively domain-
general individual difference and become increasingly differentiated as children mature 
into adulthood? Finally, are particular domain-specific subtypes of impulsivity more 
amenable to environmental influence, including direct intervention? The well-known 
importance of self-control competence for successful development and the centrality of 
this construct for any complete understanding of human nature suggest that these and 
related research questions be undertaken in earnest. 
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Table 1 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings and Internal Reliability Estimates for Student-, Teacher-, Parent-Report Items in Studies 1 
and 2 
    Study 1   Study 2 
  
Student 
 
Teacher 1 
 
Teacher 2 
 
Parent 
Item 1 2   1 2   1 2   1 2 
Interpersonal Impulsivity 
           
 
…interrupted other people 0.54 0.14 
 
0.77 0.11 
 
0.73 0.11 
 
0.45 0.24 
 
…said something rude 0.75 -0.03 
 
0.96 -0.03 
 
0.98 -0.02 
 
0.59 0.15 
 
…lost temper 0.66 -0.05 
 
0.92 0.00 
 
0.89 -0.01 
 
0.94 -0.12 
 
…talked back when upset 0.72 -0.05 
 
0.98 -0.04 
 
0.98 -0.04 
 
0.72 0.01 
Schoolwork Impulsivity 
           
 
…forgot something needed for school 0.06 0.58 
 
0.03 0.92 
 
0.01 0.92 
 
-0.08 0.67 
 
…could not find something because of mess -0.16 0.58 
 
0.01 0.92 
 
-0.03 0.96 
 
0.14 0.52 
 
…did not remember what someone said to do 0.05 0.45 
 
0.04 0.81 
 
0.15 0.77 
 
0.09 0.60 
 
…mind wandered 0.15 0.52   -0.06 0.87   -0.08 0.86   -0.01 0.80 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.76 0.63   0.95 0.94   0.94 0.93   0.77 0.81 
Notes. Items were paraphrased for presentation purposes. Factor loadings are from oblique promax solutions (promax k = 4). 
Factor loadings greater than .40 are shown in bold. Factor correlations were .60 for the self-report items, .47 for the teacher 1 
items, and .40 for the teacher 2 items.
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Table 2 
Two-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Student-, Teacher-, and Parent-
Report Models in Study 
    Student   Teacher   Parent 
    1 2   1 2   1 2 
Interpersonal Impulsivity 
        
 
…interrupted other people 0.56 0.00 
 
0.72 0.00 
 
0.68 0.00 
 
…said something rude 0.73 0.00 
 
0.85 0.00 
 
0.80 0.00 
 
…lost temper 0.62 0.00 
 
0.87 0.00 
 
0.73 0.00 
 
…talked back when upset 0.61 0.00 
 
0.89 0.00 
 
0.85 0.00 
Schoolwork Impulsivity 
        
 
…forgot something needed 
for school 0.00 0.44 
 
0.00 0.90 
 
0.00 0.62 
 
…could not find something 
because of mess 0.00 0.39 
 
0.00 0.93 
 
0.00 0.52 
 
…did not remember what 
someone said to do 0.00 0.65 
 
0.00 0.76 
 
0.00 0.69 
 
…mind wandered 0.00 0.68   0.00 0.77   0.00 0.69 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.72 0.63   0.89 0.91   0.84 0.71 
Model Fit Statistics                 
 
χ² (df = 19) 141.36*** 
 
362.94*** 
 
85.37*** 
 
CFI 0.90 
 
0.92 
 
0.95 
 
RMSEA 0.097 
 
0.162 
 
0.089 
 
SRMR 0.05 
 
0.07 
 
0.05 
  
Δχ² (Δdf = 1) relative to one-
factor model 323.18***   364.47***   170.59*** 
Notes. Items were paraphrased for presentation purposes. Factor loadings are from 
oblique two-factor models. Factor correlations were .88 for the student-report items, .70 
for the teacher-report items, and .73 for the parent-report items. Factor loadings are 
shown in bold and are significant at p < .001. Self-report n = 690; teacher-report n = 688; 
and parent-report n = 445. 
***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Domain-Specific Associations Between Interpersonal and Schoolwork Impulsivity and 
Temperament, Personality, and Other Outcomes 
        β   
Measure M SD Interpersonal Schoolwork p
a 
Study 1 (N = 453) 
GPA 81.63 7.64 -.06 -.59*** <.001 
Study 2 (N = 166) 
GPA 6.57 1.34 -.11 -.31** 0.22 
Hours Studying Per Day 1.53 0.92 -.07 -.16* 0.21 
Hours Watching TV Per Day 2.46 1.48 .04 .20** 0.02 
Study 3 (N = 712) 
Temperament 
     
 
Activation Control 3.43 0.71 -.07 -.38*** <.001 
 
Attention 3.41 0.57 -.09 -.35*** <.001 
 
Aggression 2.25 0.79 .51*** -.01 <.001 
 
Frustration 3.31 0.61 .26*** -.01 0.004 
 
Surgency 3.11 0.78 .19*** -.04 0.015 
Big Five Personality 
     
 
Openness to Experience 3.58 0.46 .06 -.21*** 0.004 
 
Conscientiousness 3.47 0.62 -.08* -.68*** <.001 
 
Extraversion 3.34 0.63 .37*** -.12* <.001 
 
Agreeableness 3.65 0.56 -.59*** -.12** <.001 
 
Neuroticism 2.83 0.52 .32*** .11* 0.008 
Outcomes 
     
 
Popularityb 2.47 1.93 .02 -.12 0.25 
 
GPA 2.91 0.80 -.06 -.46*** <.001 
  Conduct Grades 3.86 0.73 -.30*** -.42*** 0.12 
Note. Betas (β) are from simultaneous multiple regression equations including both 
interpersonal and schoolwork impulsivity as predictors. Significantly larger betas within 
a pair are boldfaced. 
a
Two-tailed p-value for the difference in betas. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 129 
 
 
Table 4 
Cross-Tabulation of Students into High, Medium, and Low Schoolwork and Interpersonal 
Impulsivity Groupings 
    Interpersonal Impulsivity 
Schoolwork Impulsivity High Medium Low 
Study 1 (N = 453) 
 High 20% 9% 4% 
 Medium 9% 13% 11% 
 Low 6% 10% 19% 
Study 2 (N = 166) 
 High 24% 10% 5% 
 Medium 6% 13% 14% 
  Low 4% 5% 18% 
Study 3 (N = 712) 
 High 22% 8% 2% 
 Medium 12% 13% 7% 
  Low 3% 10% 22% 
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Figure 1. Confirmatory Two-Factor Model for Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale for 
Children (DISC). 
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Appendix 
 
Domain-Specific Impulsivity Scale for Children (DISC) 
 
For the following questions, please indicate how often [you / this student / your child] did 
the following during the past school year.  
 
1 = almost never, 2 = about once a month, 3 = about 2-3 times a month, 4 = about once a 
week, 5 = at least once a day 
 
Self-report 
1. I forgot something I needed for class. 
2. I interrupted other students while they were talking. 
3. I said something rude. 
4. I couldn't find something because my desk, locker, or bedroom was messy. 
5. I lost my temper at home or at school. 
6. I did not remember what my teacher told me to do. 
7. My mind wandered when I should have been listening. 
8. I talked back to my teacher or parent when I was upset. 
 
Teacher 
1. This student forgot something he or she needed for class. 
2. This student interrupted other students while they were talking. 
3. This student said something rude. 
4. This student couldn't find something needed for class (e.g. pencil, notebook, 
assignment etc). 
5. This student lost his/her temper. 
6. This student did not remember what his/her teacher told him or her to do. 
7. This student's stopped listening because his/her mind was wandering. 
8. This student talked back when he/she was upset. 
 
Parent 
1. My child left something he/she needed for school at home. 
2. My child interrupted other people while they were talking. 
3. My child said something rude. 
4. My child couldn't find something because his/her bedroom was messy. 
5. My child lost his/her temper. 
6. My child did not remember what someone told him/her to do. 
7. My child stopped listening because his/her mind was wandering. 
8. My child talked back when he/she was upset. 
 
 
Schoolwork impulsivity is calculated as the mean of 1, 4, 6 and 7. 
Interpersonal impulsivity is calculated as the mean of 2, 3, 5 and 8. 
